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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Drug abuse is a serious problem in the United States. According to the Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), in 2007 about 3.7 percent of the U.S. 
population aged twelve years old or older (9.3 million people) were current illicit drug users who 
used drugs other than marijuana (the most commonly used illicit drug) (SAMHSA, 2008). 
Chronic drug users are also likely to be the perpetrators and victims of criminal activity (French, 
et al., 2004); chronic drug users also use more inpatient and emergency care than others (French, 
et al., 2000). 
Illicit drug users abusing prescription pain relievers—including opioid pain relievers such 
as Oxycontin, Percocet, Tylox, Percodan, hydrocodone, and morphine—were estimated to stand 
at 5.2 million, or 2.1 percent of the population twelve years old or older. This is a statistically 
significant increase from the 2004 rate of 1.8 percent. The number of current heroin users in 
2007 fell to only 0.06 percent of the twelve-or-older population, down from 0.14 percent in 
2006. Prescription opioids are the primary substance of abuse for 18% of substance abuse 
treatment admissions (SAMHSA, 2006). 
Opioid abuse is serious not only because of its prevalence but also because of its toll. In 
2006, 38 of the metropolitan areas covered by the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) had 
30 or more drug-related deaths (Ball & Albright, 2009). In all but three of these metropolitan 
areas, opiates and other opioids were involved in more deaths than any other drug. In each of the 
three metropolitan areas where opiates/opioids were not involved in the most drug-related 
deaths, they were a close second; cocaine was involved in fewer than ten more deaths. The 
urgency of combating opioid dependence to reduce the number of drug-related deaths can be 
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illustrated by noting that heroin—despite its low prevalence and its being involved in the fewest 
of the opiate/opioid-related deaths reported by DAWN—is still, in many metropolitan areas, 
involved in more than 5 percent of drug-related deaths.   
A treatment gap remains for opioid addicts (Kissen, et al., 2006). Admissions for primary 
heroin abuse increased by 11% from 1995 – 2005, but planned medication-assisted therapy 
decreased by almost 30% (SAMHSA, 2007). Studies have shown that the most effective way to 
treat opioid dependence is with opioid agonist treatment, wherein the drug of abuse is replaced 
with a similar opioid that prevents withdrawal symptoms and even the euphoric effects of the 
drug of abuse (Mattick, 2009). Historically, licensed opioid treatment programs (OTPs), or 
“methadone clinics”, have been the only source of this kind of effective treatment against opioid 
dependence. Methadone maintenance works well (Ling & Wesson, 2003), but it is subject to 
several drawbacks. First, it is time consuming, requiring patients to travel as frequently as daily 
to methadone clinics where they received doses of methadone. This time cost is important to 
patients seeking treatment (Borisova & Goodman, 2004). Secondly, methadone is a full-agonist 
at µ-receptors, which means that patients can develop a dependence on methadone and that 
methadone overdoses can be fatal. Thirdly, office-based treatment (as opposed to methadone 
clinic treatment) brings in patients not usually seen in methadone clinics who are more likely to 
be young, white and hepatitis-C negative (Sullivan, et al., 2005).  
The Narcotic Addiction Treatment Act of 1974 (NATA 1974) addressed the serious issue 
of diversion of methadone by creating a complicated regulatory structure—allowing only 
approved programs the ability to provide narcotic medications for drug addiction treatment. The 
Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA 2000), however, allows physicians to receive a 
waiver from these regulations for the purpose of prescribing and dispensing FDA-approved 
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Schedule III, IV and V narcotic medications for treatment of opioid dependence. The only drugs 
in these schedules that are approved by the FDA for the treatment of opioid dependence are 
Subutex and Suboxone, sublingual high-dose preparations of buprenorphine. The federal 
regulation of the use of methadone in OTPs remains unchanged by DATA 2000. 
Buprenorphine is a partial agonist that produces a weaker opioid effect. Because of its 
weaker opioid effect, it can be prescribed by a doctor and self-administered by patients, thus 
eliminating most of the time cost associated with the use of methadone for treatment of opioid 
dependence. Other potential benefits of buprenorphine include an easier withdrawal, a reduced 
chance of fatal overdoses, and a lower likelihood of abuse by patients or diversion to abuse by 
non-patients.  
The provision of the waivers introduced by DATA 2000, by allowing office-based 
physicians to treat opioid dependence with the use of buprenorphine, marks an historic turning 
point in the treatment of opioid dependence in the U.S. The relative openness of the provision of 
waivers (compared to the tight regulation under NATA 1974) also potentially brings into the 
substance abuse treatment community many physicians not otherwise professionally concerned 
with substance abuse treatment; any physician, regardless of their specialty or their practice 
setting, can qualify for a waiver. 
Complicating matters, however, is a 30-patient caseload maximum placed on office-
based physicians treating opioid dependent patients with buprenorphine under such a waiver 
(Stanton, et al., 2006). Originally, there was a 30-patient limit on physicians and group practices. 
The restriction on group practices was removed in August 2005, so that the caseload maximum 
limit is now a per-physician limit. The restrictions changed again at the very end of 2006 to 
allow physicians to treat up to 100 patients once the physician has a year of experience and files 
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a second notification with the DEA. This caseload max is central to the present study. OTPs may 
use buprenorphine without a DATA 2000 waiver, and are thus not subject to the 30-patient or 
100-patient limit. The purpose of this restriction is to curb diversion to abuse, which was the 
intention of NATA 1974. 
Though the effectiveness of and issues related to office-based treatment of opioid 
dependence with buprenorphine have been explored in the substance abuse treatment literature, 
there has not been any work in the field of economics to model and understand physician 
behavior in this context, especially physician response to a caseload maximum. This study 
attempts to provide some understanding. 
 
1.2 THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study examines the behavior of office-based physicians using buprenorphine to treat 
opioid dependence. This study seeks to explore whether physician differences reveal themselves 
through different behaviors, specifically physician choices regarding the prescription of 
buprenorphine to opioid dependent patients in the face of a caseload maximum. In particular, 
physicians have to make a decision about whether to use buprenorphine only to help patients 
discontinue the substance of abuse, or to keep the patient on buprenorphine indefinitely and 
maintain a long-term relationship with the patient (“maintenance”). Many observable physician 
differences may contribute to the physician’s choices over these two treatment paths. 
Physicians become qualified to receive a waiver under DATA 2000 if they hold one of a 
number of certifications related to addiction or if they complete an approved eight-hour training 
course. The eight hours of training is likely to be the most attractive route for physicians not 
otherwise professionally involved in the treatment of addiction. These training courses are 
offered in person or electronically, via CD-ROM over the internet. On-line/CD-ROM-based 
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training courses are offered by the American Society of Addiction Medicine and the American 
Academy of Addiction Psychiatry for $175 and $189 respectively. There is no reason to believe 
that this cost is in any way prohibitive for physicians. Furthermore, these training courses (both 
in person and electronic) qualify for AMA PRA Category 1 Credit™—credit for continuing 
medical education (CME) that many physicians earn as required by their state licensing boards, 
medical specialties societies or boards, hospital staffs, or insurance groups.  
Holding a board certification in addiction medicine, on the other hand, demonstrates a 
professional commitment to the treatment of substance abuse. At the minimum, it can be 
expected that the typical physician holding a board certification may approach the office-based 
treatment of opioid dependence differently than the typical physician who received only eight 
hours of online training. 
The perceived benefit to physicians can also be affected by demographic characteristics. 
Some physicians may consider it likely that they will encounter suitable opioid dependent 
patients in need of treatment on a regular basis; others may consider this unlikely. In the face of a 
caseload maximum, this likelihood could affect physician behavior. 
Perceived costs may differ as well. Among physicians who do not specialize in addiction 
medicine, differences in specialty may contribute to different choices regarding the treating of 
opioid dependence with buprenorphine. Specialties differ by the amount of training involved, 
average number of hours worked, average income earned, and the skills or temperament 
required. Since specialty choice is endogenous, specialty choice should reveal differences among 
physicians, and that these differences might also impact choices related to treatment of opioid 
dependence. If it is the case that certain treatment paths are more time-intensive than others, or 
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that certain treatment paths are more profitable than others, perceived opportunity costs (in terms 
of forgone income and forgone leisure) will therefore also differ.  
Physician practice setting can impact the costs of providing substance abuse treatment as 
well. Some practice settings may be more or less appropriate for the treatment of drug-addicted 
patients, due to the potential interaction with other patients, or due to proximity of appropriate 
counseling and other non-pharmaceutical therapies opioid dependent patients may need in 
addition to buprenorphine treatment.  
This study considers the practicality of closing the treatment gap in opioid dependence by 
allowing office-based non-addiction-specializing physicians to treat opioid dependence using 
buprenorphine. It does not judge the appropriateness of such an approach—the substance abuse 
community is best-suited for that evaluation and has consistently embraced the approach—but 
rather to discover and explore differences in the ways that physicians respond to new treatment 
(and potential profit) opportunities as well as the federal regulations that govern them. 
 
1.3 FINDINGS 
Following the introductory chapter, there are seven more chapters. Chapter 2 is a review 
of the relevant literature on the treatment of opioid dependence with buprenorphine, including 
the proper protocols for prescribing and dispensing buprenorphine. Absent any compelling 
reason not to, the National Institutes of Health encourages physicians to treat opioid dependence 
with buprenorphine using long-term maintenance, rather than withdrawing patients from 
buprenorphine once stable. This chapter also covers the waiver process, and highlights the ease 
with which physicians can become certified to prescribe buprenorphine, as well as the ease with 
which physicians can increase their caseload maximum from 30 to 100.  
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Chapter 3 is a review of the economic literature regarding physician behavior with a 
particular focus on the topic of supplier-induced demand (SID), sometimes also called physician-
induced demand (PID). The present study avoids many of the pitfalls of previous studies that 
incorporated supplier-induced demand, though making a case for or against the existence of 
supplier-induced demand is not the focus of the present study.  
The algebraic model is presented in Chapter 4. This model simplifies physician choice 
with respect to treatment of opioid dependence to two decisions: the choice of a price/quantity 
schedule for taking on new opioid dependent patients, and the choice of an optimal fraction of 
those patients successfully stabilized who will undergo maintenance treatment. Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions give rise to three experiments in particular: one related to the number of patients on 
maintenance, one related to the number of non-maintenance patients, and one related to 
differences brought about by the change in the caseload maximum in the total numbers of 
patients.  
Chapters 5 and 6 present the data: its sources, the characteristics of the sample, its 
limitations and the methods used for variable creation. In Chapter 6, tests for heteroskedasticity 
in the data and two approaches for dealing with it are also discussed. 
The results of the empirical testing are discussed in Chapter 7. Three experiments are 
done: one on the number of maintenance patients (Experiment #1), one on the number of non-
maintenance patients (Experiment #3), and one on the differences in the total numbers of patients 
after a change in the caseload maximum (Experiment #2). In general, the results of the three 
experiments confirm the predictions of the algebraic model presented in Chapter 4. Physician 
specialty appears to reveal much about physician market power and opportunity costs. 
Physicians in primary-care-type specialties (like internal medicine, family medicine and 
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pediatrics) treat more patients than do physicians in other specialties. Physicians who are 
certified in addiction medicine, report addiction medicine as a primary specialty or report 
dedicating a high percentage of their practices to treating patients for substance abuse also treat 
more patients, suggesting that they face lower opportunity costs. Practice setting appears to 
reveal less about market power and opportunity cost, so there are only limited results that link 
practice setting to physician treatment choices. The empirical results from Chapter 7 
overwhelmingly support the result that physicians will treat more patients as a result of an 
increase in the caseload maximum, but that this effect is stronger for maintenance.  
Chapter 8 presents a summary of the study and its conclusions. The implications for 
policy and for substance abuse treatment are discussed, and suggestions are made for further 
research.  
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CHAPTER 2: OPIOID ADDICTION TREATMENT WITH 
BUPRENORPHINE 
2.1 TREATMENT PROTOCOLS 
The Office of Evaluation, Scientific Analysis and Synthesis of the CSAT publishes 
Treatment Improvement Protocols (TIPs) to provide best practice guidelines for the treatment 
of substance abuse. TIP 40, entitled “Clinical Guidelines for the Use of Buprenorphine in the 
Treatment of Opioid Addiction” (CSAT 2004) offers recommendations on the use of 
buprenorphine in clinical settings based on the experiences and the research of experts in the 
field. This section will summarize the recommendations in the TIP that pertain to physician 
choice within the scope of the current study. 
Buprenorphine is currently commercially available in two medications: Subutex and 
Suboxone. Both are sublingual tablets, and both come in 2mg and 8mg doses. Subutex is 
buprenorphine only; Suboxone is four parts buprenorphine and one part naloxone. Naloxone 
is added to make the abuse of Suboxone undesirable, as it should block the opioid effect of 
the injection of crushed Suboxone tablets, and perhaps even precipitate withdrawal 
symptoms. The combination of buprenorphine and naloxone is referred to generally as 
“combination therapy,” though currently it only exists under the trade name Suboxone. The 
CSAT recommends that combination therapy be used whenever possible, and only suggests 
the use of “monotherapy” (buprenorphine alone) in a few cases, such as when the patient is a 
pregnant woman. 
The clinical use of buprenorphine to treat opioid dependence can involve the 
following phases: tapering, wherein dosages of the opioid on which the patient is dependent 
are reduced; induction, wherein the patient is first switched to buprenorphine; stabilization, 
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wherein the patient is monitored to ensure the successful switch from the drug of abuse to 
buprenorphine; maintenance, wherein other issues related to or arising from drug abuse (such 
as psychosocial and family issues) are addressed; and dose reduction, where dosages of 
buprenorphine are tapered until the patient finally discontinues the use of buprenorphine. 
Exactly which of these phases treatment will actually involve hinges on two primary factors: 
whether the patient is seeking to discontinue the use of a long-acting opioid (like methadone) 
or a short-acting opioid (like heroin or Oxycodone), and whether the physician chooses to 
withdraw the patient from buprenorphine after the patient is stabilized or to maintain the 
patient on buprenorphine for an extended period of time.  
For patients discontinuing the use of a long-acting opioid, such as methadone, they 
must first taper their usual dose to no more than 30mg daily before they can be switched to 
buprenorphine. This tapering is not necessary for a patient using a short-acting opioid; these 
patients should simply discontinue use and be switched to buprenorphine1. If the physician 
chooses to immediately withdraw a patient, there will be no maintenance phase. If the 
physician chooses to use buprenorphine for long term maintenance, there may or may not be 
a dose reduction phase, as some patients may stay on buprenorphine indefinitely. If a 
patient’s doses of buprenorphine are reduced and the patient is taken off of buprenorphine, 
this constitutes withdrawal, whether or not the patient had previously been maintained. Many 
in the substance abuse treatment community use the word “detoxification” in place of 
“withdrawal.” Table 2.1 summarizes the phases of treatment under the four possible 
circumstances. 
                                                 
1
 If a patient is discontinuing the use of a long-acting opioid, the physician is encouraged to use monotherapy 
(Subutex) when initially switching the patient to buprenorphine, and then to use combination therapy 
(Suboxone) as soon as possible thereafter; patients discontinuing short-acting opioids should only be treated 
with combination therapy. 
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In Chapter 4, the physician’s choices about the number of patients to take on and the 
fraction to keep on maintenance will be the dependent variables. Regarding this choice, TIP 
40 summarizes: 
“The preponderance of research evidence and clinical experience, however, 
indicates that opioid maintenance treatments have a much higher likelihood of long-
term success than do any forms of withdrawal treatment. In any event, the immediate 
goals in starting buprenorphine should be stabilization of the patient and abstinence 
from illicit opioids, rather than any arbitrary or predetermined schedule of withdrawal 
from the prescribed medication.” 
 
Despite this warning about predetermined schedules, it is difficult to believe that 
physician-specific differences such as specialty, practice setting, etc., will not at least in part 
influence treatment choice.  
 
TABLE 2.1 – The phases of clinical treatment of opioid dependence with 
buprenorphine. 
 Physician-determined treatment approach 
 
Withdrawal 
Maintenance then 
Withdrawal 
Maintenance 
O
pi
o
id
 
o
f a
bu
se
 
Long-
acting 
Tapering, Induction, 
Stabilization, and 
Dose Reduction 
Tapering, Induction, 
Stabilization, Maintenance, 
and Dose Reduction 
Tapering, Induction, 
Stabilization, and 
Maintenance 
Short-
acting 
Induction, 
Stabilization, and 
Dose Reduction 
Induction, Stabilization, 
Maintenance, and Dose 
Reduction 
Induction, 
Stabilization, and 
Maintenance 
 
 
2.2 THE EFFICACY OF BUPRENORPHINE FOR TREATMENT OF OPIOID 
DEPENDENCE 
Many studies have confirmed the efficacy and safety of buprenorphine (Mello & 
Mendelson, 1985; Walsh & Eisenberg, 2003; Ling, et al., 1998), even in outpatient and 
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primary care settings (Fiellin, et al., 2006; Fedula, et al., 2003; Sohler, et al., 2010; Soeffing, 
et al., 2009). With respect to retention and suppression of heroin use, it can be as effective as 
methadone (Mattick, 2008). Both patients and physicians perceive buprenorphine to be 
effective (Stanton, et al., 2006), and buprenorphine is significantly cheaper than methadone 
treatment. French, et al. (2008) have shown that non-methadone outpatient treatment costs 
$2,325 per treatment episode while methadone maintenance costs over 3 times as much. 
Probably because of its cost-effectiveness and efficacy, there is significant interest in 
prescribing buprenorphine, even among nurse practitioners and physicians’ assistants (Roose, 
et al., 2008). 
Buprenorphine use in treatment of opioid dependence is not without downsides. 
Among many physicians there still exists mistrust of substance-abusing patients, and there is 
no standard for treating pain for opioid dependent patients (Merrill, et al., 2002). Financial 
considerations also matter. Buprenorphine is excluded from 31% of insurance product 
formularies, and is in the highest-cost tier in 55% of formularies (Horgan, et al., 2008). 
Netherland, et al. (2009) have documented that training and reimbursement remain cromulent 
sources of difficulty for physicians prescribing buprenorphine, as does access to counseling 
services. Proper treatment in most cases requires maintenance and follow-up with other 
counseling services (SAMHSA, 2004; Fiellin, et al., 2004). 
 
2.3 CSAT WAIVERS 
 Title XXXV of the Children’s Health Act of 2000, otherwise known as The Drug 
Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA 2000), modified the Controlled Substances Act to 
allow physicians to receive a waiver from the usual prohibition of the use of Schedule III, IV 
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or V narcotics for the treatment of opioid dependence. Opioid treatment programs (OTPs) or 
“methadone clinics” are regulated under the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act of 1974, and do 
not require additional permissions to use buprenorphine treatment to treat opioid dependence. 
Only physicians outside of these or other tightly-regulated in-patient treatment facilities 
require such a waiver.  
In order to qualify for a waiver under DATA 2000, a physician (either an M.D. or 
D.O.) must demonstrate necessary training, background or experience in addiction medicine 
broadly or treatment of opioid dependence with buprenorphine specifically, demonstrate the 
ability to refer opioid dependent patients to other psychosocial services (such as group or 
individual therapy), and agree not to carry a caseload of patients being treated with 
buprenorphine that exceeds a certain maximum, initially set at 30 patients and then increased 
to 100 patients after one year of prescribing buprenorphine. The necessary training, 
background or experience is demonstrated by one or more of the following:  
• The physician holds a subspecialty board certification in addiction psychology 
from the American Board of Medical Specialties. 
• The physician holds an addiction treatment certification from the American 
Society of Addiction Medicine. 
• The physician holds a subspecialty board certification in addiction medicine from 
the American Osteopathic Association.  
• The physician participated as an investigator in one or more clinical trials which 
led to the approval of a Schedule III, IV or V narcotic for the treatment of opioid 
dependence. 
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• The physician has received other training or experience that is approved by that 
physician’s state medical licensing board or the Department of Health and Human 
Services. 
• The physician has completed at least eight hours of approved training in the 
treatment and management of opioid addicted patients2. 
A physician seeking a waiver first notifies the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services of intent to treat patients with buprenorphine. The notification form can be 
completed and submitted online or faxed or mailed in. The recipient of this notification 
within the Department of Health and Human Services is the Division of Pharmacologic 
Therapies (DPT) within the Center for Substance Abuse (CSAT) within the Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). After receiving this notification, 
CSAT reviews the notification and determines whether the physician meets the criteria for a 
waiver then notifies the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that the physician is qualified. 
The DEA issues to the physician a unique identification number indicating the physician’s 
qualifications. (These waivers are often referred to as “CSAT waivers.”) 
In late 2006, Title XI of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization 
Act further amended the Controlled Substances Act by granting physicians the opportunity to 
seek permission to treat up to 100 patients, so long as the physician currently has a CSAT 
waiver and it has been one year since they filed their initial notification with CSAT. In order 
to increase the patient limit, a physician files a second notification with CSAT indicating 
intent to treat up to 100 patients. Because the requirements for the patient caseload increase 
                                                 
2
 Approved training can be provided by the American Academy of Addiction Psychiatry, the American Medical 
Association, the American Osteopathic Academy of Addiction Medicine, the American Psychiatric Association, 
the American Society of Addiction Medicine, or other organizations approved by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services. 
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are simple and easily understandable, the submission of a second notification permits the 
physician to begin treating more patients; the physician does not need to wait for CSAT 
confirmation. Physician response to an increase in the allowable patient caseload maximum 
is a primary focus of this study. 
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CHAPTER 3: PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR AND SUPPLIER-INDUCED 
DEMAND 
3.1 PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR 
 The data presented in Chapter 5 and analyzed in Chapters 6 and 7 provide the ability to 
compare physicians along several important dimensions, including primary specialty and 
practice setting. This section will provide a brief review of the literature with respect to these 
important physician-level variables. 
 The issue of physician specialty has been studied extensively in the literature. The four 
variables that are most usually analyzed in relation to specialty choice are educational 
indebtedness, specialty potential earnings, years of graduate medical education required and 
number of work hours. Bazzoli (1985) showed that educational indebtedness can affect specialty 
choice, but that the impact is modest. It could be that physicians address the issue of educational 
indebtedness through other labor market decisions, like the decision to moonlight while in 
residency (Culler and Bazzoli, 1985).  
 There is a general consensus in the literature that the effect of potential earnings on 
likelihood of specialty choice is positive but modest. Hadley (1977) failed to find an impact at 
all, but Bazzoli (1985) and Sloan (1970) found a small but statistically significant effect from 
income, such that physicians were more likely to choose specialties that offered higher potential 
earnings. McKay (1990) showed that the percent of residents in a specialty increased less-than-
proportionately when relative earnings for that specialty increased. When examining the variance 
in recent trends (from late 1990s to early 2000s) in specialty choice, Dorsey et al. (2003) found 
that income explained only 9% of the overall variability.  
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 The literature fails to find a consistent effect from the number of years of graduate 
medical education required in a specialty. McKay (1990) found that length of training did not 
matter, and Dorsey et al. (2003) found that years of required education explained 0.3% of the 
variability in recent trends in physician choice—but in the counterintuitive direction. Physicians 
appeared to have a preference for specialties that required 4 or more years of graduate medical 
education, even after controlling for income.  
 Dorsey et al. (2003) also found, somewhat surprisingly, that number of expected work 
hours explained 1% of the variability in specialty choice, with physicians demonstrating a 
preference for specialties with more work hours (even after controlling for income). McKay 
(1990) found, however, the contrary result: that the percentage of residents choosing a particular 
specialty increases more than proportionately when the relative number of hours worked 
decreases.  
 The study by Dorsey et al. also identified another variable useful in distinguishing 
specialties: controllable lifestyle. Fifty-five percent of the variability in trends in specialty choice 
was explained by physicians revealing a preference for a controllable lifestyle. Despite the 
inconsistent nature of some of these results, two general conclusions emerge: physician specialty 
choice is endogenous, and reflects careful consideration by residents and medical school students 
of many variables; potential income explains some, but certainly not all, of a physician’s choice 
of medical specialty.  
 The fact that non-pecuniary considerations are important factors in the choice of specialty 
is underscored by the results of Burstein and Cromwell’s (1985) study on the rates of return from 
training of U.S. physicians. They found that the pediatricians in their study received negative real 
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rates of return from their specialty training. The fact that physicians chose a specialty with a 
negative rate of return suggests that lifestyle or other considerations are important. 
 Physician specialty may also reveal something about the market structure in which the 
physician operates, which will be an issue in the discussion in the next section of demand 
inducement. Wong (1996) showed that the market for many physician services was likely to be 
monopolistically competitive, but that the reliability of that result depended on the specialty 
under investigation. That conclusion held well for primary care physician services, as well as the 
markets for general and family practice services and general surgery. For internal medicine, the 
results were less conclusive, though monopoly structure was successfully ruled out. After 
adjusting his model to correct some empirical problems, Wong found stronger evidence that the 
market for internal medicine is likely characterized by monopolistic competition, but with 
“informational confusion,” whereby rising physician supply increases search costs, which put net 
upward, not downward, pressure on prices. So in addition to providing some information about 
the physician, specialty also provides information about the market structure in which the 
physician’s practice operates. 
  David and Neuman (2011) have recently explored the division of labor among physicians 
between different practice settings. Their findings indicate that when physicians have the ability 
to split patients between different practice settings, that decision hinges on considerations such as 
the complexity of the patient’s case, the risk of serious complication, and the distance of the 
practice setting from a hospital. The important implication for the model discussed in Chapter 4 
is that physician practice setting is also a part of the bundle of a priori physician choices that bear 
on the physician’s decisions about treating patients. Further, the authors point out that this can 
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result in cream-skimming, whereby low-risk patients are moved from hospital settings and into 
other separated practice settings, leaving hospitals with higher risk (and higher cost) patients. 
 The final physician-specific variable of interest is board certification. Wilensky and 
Rossiter (1983) showed that board eligibility raised incomes on average by $8,000 per year, 
while board certification raised incomes on average by $13,000. The differential effect of board 
certification versus board eligibility is interpreted by the authors as reflecting differences such as 
improved referrals and staffing privileges, and not simply the result of procedure-specific 
training. 
  
3.2 SUPPLIER-INDUCED DEMAND 
 The model presented in Chapter 4 assumes that the physician faces a downward-sloping 
demand curve for detoxification treatment and then induces demand for follow-up, or 
maintenance, treatment. Supplier-induced demand (SID) is a controversial topic, and special 
attention is given to it here. The recognition of the phenomenon is generally traced back to Evans 
(1974) who observed that physician incomes in British Columbia did not vary the way that 
physician supply did. Evans concluded that physicians must be adjusting their treatment intensity 
in order to prevent income from changing, even if patient caseloads did change.  
In this section, a summary of the current literature on SID will be presented, starting first 
with the various definitions of SID, then moving on to the findings of the SID literature; the next 
section presents the assumptions of the model presented in Chapter 4 in light of the discussion of 
SID in this chapter.  
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3.2.1 DEFINING SUPPLIER-INDUCED DEMAND 
The definition of SID is important because it has serious economic implications. The 
ability of physicians to influence the demand for the medical services they produce has a twofold 
origin: information asymmetry and third-party payment. It is information asymmetry that makes 
demand inducement possible. Most patients do not have the medical expertise to appraise the 
necessity of certain medical treatments. In this way, the physician/patient relationship can be 
modeled much like the mechanic/customer relationship and other professional services 
agent/principal relationships. The agent offers a recommendation to the principal who must 
assess how well the agent’s goals line up with his or her own goals and the likelihood that the 
recommendation is a good one, given the constraints on the agent such as the costs of making 
spurious recommendations (e.g., bad reputation). The presence of third-party payers exacerbates 
this problem, however, by reducing the cost to patients of allowing themselves to be induced into 
purchasing something they do not need.  
Generally, SID is modeled as imperfect agency on the part of the physician. The 
physician engages in SID when he or she recommends medical care that has a marginal health 
benefit that is lower than its marginal cost only because the impact on physician net income is 
positive. The exact nature of this process is described differently by different researchers. Some 
model SID as a game of cheap talk (Calcott, 1999; De Jaegher and Jegers, 2001); others consider 
the possibility of fraud on the part of the physician (Wolinsky, 1993); still others describe it as a 
physician’s rational participation in the patient’s search process (Rochaix, 1989). Ellis and 
McGuire (1990) have pointed out that third-party payment schemes can often cause quantity 
demanded and quantity supplied to differ, and the actual amount of medical care provided in the 
market is a function of the relative bargaining power of patient and physician. SID in this case is 
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simply an expression of the physician’s relative bargaining power. Data that indicate the 
patient’s relative bargaining power are generally not available. 
The nature of the SID is likewise defined differently by different researchers. Some have 
focused on visit intensity (Delattre and Dormont, 2003), while others have focused on physician-
initiated (as opposed to patient-initiated) visits (Wilensky and Rossiter, 1983; Grytten, et al., 
1995). Most of the literature takes a negative view of the practice of demand inducement by 
assuming that the induced treatment is known by the physician to be unnecessary or unhelpful. 
Reinhardt (1985) asserts that the suggestion that demand inducement will be in the long run fully 
exploited if the possibilities for it are finite amounts to a claim that physicians are without 
conscience. The point is that SID is such shameful behavior that only the conscience-less would 
fully exploit it. Richardson (2001) interestingly points out that the provision of more care may 
be, in some cases, provision of better care in the mind of the physician, who is trained in many 
cases to believe that more care is better. Typical workload constraints prevent the provision of 
more intense care, but shrinking caseloads—perhaps in response to increases in physician 
supply—provide the physician with sufficient time to provide more intense care. Finally, Carlsen 
and Grytten (2000) conclude that SID, if it does exist, does not pose a problem because it leads 
to greater patient satisfaction. If the demand curve for physician services is shifted outward (even 
through demand inducement), then consumer surplus is higher.  
The definition of SID that is employed in the model presented in the next chapter is a 
simple one: supplier-induced demand represents the physician’s ability, through whatever means, 
to convince a patient to receive treatment of a specific type—or to deny a patient treatment of a 
specific type—without losing that patient as a customer for other types of care. 
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3.2.2 FINDING SUPPLIER-INDUCED DEMAND 
Attempts to identify SID empirically have generated mixed results. Many studies have 
supported the existence of SID (Folmer and Westerhout, 2008; Melichar, 2009; Schaafsma, 
1994; Carlsen and Grytten, 2000; Delattre and Dormont, 2003; Wilensky and Rossiter, 1983b), 
and many studies have not (Feldman and Sloan, 1988; Carlsen and Grytten, 1998; Hay and 
Leahy, 1982).  
Part of the reason for the inconsistency of the results of SID studies is that it is not 
entirely clear what impact SID ought to have on the modeling of physician behavior or the 
equilibrium conditions. If demand inducement is expressed as a limited ability to shift the 
demand curve, then the demand curve still constrains price and quantity (albeit at a higher level 
of each), and the physician behaves just as before. If demand inducement is expressed as an 
unbounded ability to shift the demand curve, then price will always be infinity and so will 
quantity, unless inducement is costly. In the case of costly inducement, the physician is trading 
away the normal demand-curve constraint on price and quantity for an additional component in 
the cost function. This modeling would certainly be different, but it is not clear whether or how 
these differences would manifest themselves in ways observable by the econometrician.  
Based on Evans’ (1974) observation that physician incomes could be more stable than 
physician supply in a particular market, the most common tests for the existence of SID have 
analyzed physician response to an increase in the local supply of physicians (Peacock and 
Richardson, 2007; Delattre and Dormont, 2003; Carlsen and Grytten, 2000; Wilensky and 
Rossiter, 1983b; Richardson, 2001). It is reasoned that if the local supply of physicians (or 
physician services) increases, prices and profits would tend to fall. In order to combat this 
reduction in profit, physicians respond by inducing demand for services, so that patient treatment 
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becomes more intensive. This increase in services per patient offsets the reduction in price so 
physician profits are at least in part preserved. 
This approach is subject to criticism. Much of the criticism in the literature focuses on the 
ambiguous econometrics, such as the identification problem discussed by Auster and Oaxaca 
(1981) and dismissed by Peacock and Richardson (2007), who claim that including the quantity 
of physicians in the demand function does not cause an identification problem if the supply 
variable is quantity of services provided, not physician quantity. Phelps (1986) also pointed out 
the important difference between the supply of physicians and the supply of the physician-firm 
output. However, other criticisms exist.  
One such criticism is that an increase in physician supply in a particular market is 
unlikely to be exogenous. Rather, it is likely that physician supply might increase in a particular 
market in response to profit opportunities. This presents a dilemma, however, because it requires 
that physicians are willing to increase their treatment intensity in response to falling prices, but 
unwilling to exploit pre-existing profit opportunities.  
One potential explanation is that physicians in the local market are earning only a normal 
rate of return, so that when prices fall even marginally, they suffer losses which can be offset 
through demand inducement activities. This deepens the paradox, because a normal rate of return 
would be expected in a competitive market for physician services, but Stano (1985 and 1987) has 
pointed out that market power is a necessary pre-condition to the ability to induce demand. The 
so-called target income hypothesis (TIH) (Rizzo and Blumenthal, 1996) might be able to 
reconcile normal rates of return with market power, but as is implied above, a positive physician 
supply shock is unlikely to occur where rates of return are normal. 
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The only theoretical formulation that reconciles these difficulties is one that combines 
TIH with low-but-positive profit targets for physicians who have some market power. The 
positive profits are sufficient to explain entry; and TIH is sufficient to explain the physician 
response to that entry. Market power is necessary to explain how a physician’s target level of 
profits could be positive. One implication of this theoretical formulation is that the market 
structure is monopolistically competitive—which is what Wong (1996) found—because of the 
existence of both market power and prices that fall in response to entry. TIH itself has been 
questioned on theoretical and empirical grounds, however (McGuire and Pauly, 1991). 
The process of inducement in the standard approach to studying inducement is also not 
well-developed. Some important questions often remain unanswered, such as: How often can 
physicians increase visit intensity through inducement—every time there is an increase in 
physician supply, or only a finite number of times? If physicians can only induce demand only a 
finite number of times, in the long run all inducements will have taken place and it is not clear 
that the researcher should be able to identify instances of inducement. On the other hand, it is 
difficult to believe that inducement opportunities are infinite because there must exist some 
upper bound on visit intensity.  
If within the relevant decision-making range there always exists unexploited possibilities 
for further inducement, demand inducement could become routine. A physician with an income 
target, for example, could reach that target by providing services to a mix of induced and un-
induced demanders. For the researcher, separating routine inducement from strategic inducement 
would prove both theoretically and econometrically cumbersome.  
One response to the question of whether inducement can be routine for a physician with a 
target income is to assume that inducement is costly: either monetarily (Stano, 1985 and 1987) or 
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in terms of physician utility (Folmer and Westerhout, 2008). The cost or disutility element may 
untangle inducement from routine physician behavior, but it does not do so without raising other 
issues. For example, the standard model for researching SID is one in which physicians induce 
demand in response to increases in physician supply, but it is difficult to reconcile inducement 
that is too costly to be a routine part of physician practice with inducement that is a cost-effective 
solution to recovering revenues lost in the face of falling prices.  
Models in which physicians suddenly shift to the otherwise-avoided practice of 
inducement in response to an exogenous increase in physician supply are not theoretically 
rigorous enough to be empirically useful. Even when they do find support for SID, Freebairn 
(2002) points out that these studies are faulty because the positive correlation between the 
physician-population ratio and the supply of services could reflect an availability problem. When 
the physician-population ratio increases, increased availability reduces the full price of medical 
services for patients, so that the quantity demanded rises. 
Some researchers have attempted to overcome these difficulties by examining other 
market shifts that lead to more tractable results. Schaafsma (1994) points out that in the case of 
no SID, supply shifts will lead to similar estimates of demand elasticity regardless of the source 
of the shift, but under conditions of SID, the cause of the supply shift will impact the estimated 
demand elasticity. Stano (1987) discusses the role of competition in SID, pointing out that 
inducement will not be possible under highly competitive market conditions.  
Another approach in the literature is to focus on the patient being induced to treatment. 
Given that a physician chooses to engage in a profit-maximizing level of demand inducement, 
the physician may discover that some patients are more subject to demand inducement than are 
others. This literature looks at medical care usage rates of patients by characteristics thought to 
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be related to susceptibility to inducement. However, this approach leads to endogeneity problems 
because differences in medical care usage may be related either to differences in susceptibility to 
inducement or to the characteristics by which patients were separated. Researchers often lack the 
ability to observe variables correlated with susceptibility to inducement but uncorrelated with 
medical care demand. 
Hay and Leahy (1982) show that medical professionals are at least as likely to utilize care 
as other patients. They argue that medical professionals are less likely to be susceptible to 
inducement; if physicians were inducing demand, they would target patients who were not 
medical professionals, so the pattern of medical care utilization ought to be reversed. Calcott 
(1999) points out that medically-informed patients may seek advice more often when symptoms 
(which they understand) are present. Poorly-informed patients may also underestimate the 
meaning of negative test results.  
Other studies of SID have focused on physician responses to fee changes (Folmer and 
Westerhout, 2008; Feldman and Sloan, 1988; Melichar, 2009). Still others have used game-
theoretic, search or bargaining frameworks to model SID (De Jaegher and Jegers, 2001; 
Dranove, 1988; Ellis and McGuire, 1990; Wolinksy, 1993; Rochaix, 1989). 
  
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
The fact that SID is inherently difficult to discover empirically does not mean that it 
should be abandoned. There are responsible ways and important reasons to include SID in 
models of physician behavior. Inducing demand is possible for physicians because of the 
presence of third-party payers and asymmetric information. When employed correctly, it can 
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improve profits. Whether the physician is modeled as a utility-maximizing individual or the 
owner of a profit-maximizing firm, the physician will appreciate higher income.  
The model presented in Chapter 4 will assume that the physician’s practice maximizes 
profits. A physician will be able to achieve higher levels of utility with more income, all else 
equal, as a rational utility-maximizer. Profit maximization is not inconsistent with utility 
maximization. Variables with different effects on utility and profit (such as time spent at work) 
are considered as part of a physician’s prior decisions, such as choice of medical specialty and 
whether or not to induce demand. Stated differently, the physician modeled in Chapter 4 will 
attempt to maximize profit given an a priori choice about whether (and to what degree) to engage 
in SID. The decision about whether to engage in SID may change the structure of the physician’s 
profit function, but not the physician’s optimization problem, given that function. 
The model presented in Chapter 4 will also assume that the physician’s profit can be 
influenced by the amount of inducement activity undertaken by the physician. Rather than 
inducing patients to necessarily receive more or more intense care, as is done in many of the SID 
studies, the physician modeled in the next chapter will decide whether or not to establish a long-
term relationship with a patient. Therefore, the possible “inducement” can be positive or 
negative; the physician induces the patient to accept a long-term relationship if it is profit-
maximizing to do so and induces the patient to reject a long-term relationship if it is profit-
maximizing to do so. In this way, the model presented in Chapter 4 avoids some of the issues of 
unobservable visit intensity and unobservable patient expectations.  
The physician’s inducement activity in the next chapter is subject to a three-fold 
constraint. First, as is assumed in many of the SID studies, Chapter 4 will assume that the 
inducement-related treatment in question is costly to provide. However, the model does not 
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specify whether those costs are costs of inducement activity, or rather the usual costs of 
providing treatment to patients. In this way, the model of Chapter 4 avoids this issue. Second, 
because the “maintained” long-term relationship is the treatment subject to inducement, the 
model in the next chapter implies that inducement activity is limited to the finite sample of 
patients with whom the physician has an un-induced short-term relationship governed by the 
forces of supply and demand. The third constraint is a literal one: as discussed in Chapter 2, 
physicians treating patients for opioid dependence with buprenorphine are subject to caseload 
maximums set by federal law. Taken together, these three constraints allow the model in Chapter 
4 to explain why physicians may engage in some, but not complete, inducement. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE MODEL 
4.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
The current study focuses on different approaches that a physician may take with 
patients. The categories considered in this study are “maintenance” patients—those patients 
successfully stabilized on buprenorphine and whom the physician has decided to maintain on 
buprenorphine—and “non-maintenance” patients. Non-maintenance patients can be patients in 
any of three possible phases of treatment (see Table 2.1): induction3, stabilization or dose 
reduction. Therefore, some of a physician’s non-maintenance patients will be those new patients 
still in the process of switching from a substance of abuse to buprenorphine (induction and 
stabilization). Other non-maintenance patients will be those the physician has decided to 
withdraw (or detoxify) and so are in the dose-reduction phase of treatment. After the patient has 
been successfully introduced to buprenorphine and stabilized, the physician can choose whether 
to keep the patient on buprenorphine indefinitely (“maintenance”) or to taper the doses of 
buprenorphine until the patient is withdrawn from it as well.  
It is assumed that demand for buprenorphine treatment is entirely patient-initiated and un-
induced. This is justifiable for several reasons. First, only patients dependent on opioids are 
potential candidates for treatment, and it is unlikely that physicians will have much knowledge of 
a patient’s opioid abuse except for when the patient is seeking treatment or if the patient is 
already in the physician’s care.  Also, the physicians in the sample are not all dedicated 
substance abuse specialists, so their ability to search for opioid dependent patients to induce into 
receiving treatment is limited. Finally, the decision to discontinue opioids must originate with the 
                                                 
3
 The reader should be careful to avoid confusing inducement, such as demand inducement (discussed in Chapter 3), 
with induction, which refers to the initial doses of buprenorphine that a patient receives after having just recently 
discontinued the substance of abuse.  
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abuser, although the environment of family, friends and criminal justice entities can exert 
pressure.  
The model treats the decision regarding maintenance treatment as being entirely 
physician-determined and profit-focused. There may be un-induced exogenous patient demand 
for maintenance treatment, but the decision rests with the physician. In the model, if a patient 
does not want to be maintained on buprenorphine, the physician has the ability to induce (or 
coerce) the patient to receive it; if a patient wants maintenance treatment, the physician has the 
ability to deny it without losing the patient as a substance abuse treatment patient.  
 The physician in the model is a profit-maximizer who faces a downward-sloping demand 
curve for treatment of opioid dependence with buprenorphine. The physician chooses both what 
quantity of buprenorphine treatment (induction and stabilization) to supply to the market and 
what fraction of those patients successfully stabilized to induce to maintenance treatment. The 
first choice variable is constrained by the demand curve; the second choice variable is 
constrained between 0 and 1. In addition to the profit goal and the costs associated with 
buprenorphine treatment, maintenance treatment and inducement activities, the pair of choice 
variables together is constrained by a legally-imposed caseload maximum to which the physician 
is subject. 
 There are two time periods under consideration. In the first time period, the physician 
will take on new patients and treat them through the induction and stabilization phases of 
treatment, since patients must first be successfully stabilized before being maintained. In the 
second time period, the physician will again take on some new induction and stabilization 
patients, but may have also placed some fraction of the patients successfully stabilized on 
maintenance treatment.  
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 The model makes some additional simplifying assumptions. The model assumes that 
stabilization is always successful. In reality, the physician has as potential maintenance patients 
only those patients who are successfully stabilized on buprenorphine. Of course, if there is an 
exogenous failure rate, then the model can be thought of as incorporating that failure rate into the 
physician’s choice for the fraction of patients to maintain, so the impact on the model should be 
minimal. 
 The model also assumes that there is no discount rate. Since it is only a two-period 
model, the discount rate would not have that great an impact anyway, especially when one 
considers that physicians, given the time spent in school and residency, are unlikely to be very 
myopic. If the model were extended to include additional periods (or infinite periods, which 
would be the most likely extension), a discount rate would be necessary. The absence of a 
discount rate would not significantly alter the results obtained from the model. 
 Finally, the model assumes that any patients who are withdrawn (or detoxified) are 
withdrawn within the first time period. Because it is only a two-period model, the “Maintenance 
then Withdrawal” treatment path from Table 2.1 is not possible. Induction and stabilization take 
at least one period of time in the present model. So any patients to be maintained will be 
maintained only in the second period. If those patients are to be later withdrawn, that would 
happen in a third period, which the model does not consider. In summary, in the first period of 
the model, all patients are new patients, experiencing induction to buprenorphine and 
stabilization. Some of those patients also experience dose reduction in that first time period; the 
rest return in the second time period as maintenance patients. In the second time period, the 
physician also begins again with another set of new patients. 
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4.2 THE ALGEBRAIC MODEL 
 The physician chooses to provide buprenorphine treatment to q new patients in each 
period. Demand for buprenorphine treatment is given by the inverse demand function P = p(q) 
with PQ < 0 and PQQ ≥ 0. Of those q patients treated in one period, the physician induces a 
fraction y of them to receive maintenance treatment in the next period, such that 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. The 
price that the physician receives from maintenance is proportional to and less than the price of 
induction and stabilization treatment, because it is less intense. The variable r gives the ratio of 
the maintenance price to the induction and stabilization price, such that 0 < r < 1.4 The physician 
is constrained to a maximum total caseload of X patients, so that X ≥ (1 + y) × q.  
 Revenue in the first period will include revenue only from new patients, q × p(q). In the 
second time period, revenue again includes new patients but also includes revenue from induced 
maintenance treatment, y × q × r × p(q). Therefore: 
     	
    	
    	    	 
   2  		        (1) 
 Costs from both initial buprenorphine treatment and induced maintenance treatment 
contain fixed and increasing marginal components. The fixed components are c0 and c1 
respectively. The variable component for initial induction and stabilization treatment is γ(q). The 
cost of maintenance treatment is increasing in the number of maintained patients, m = q × y, and 
is equal to ψ(m) with ψQ = yψM and ψY = qψM, where ψM is the first derivative of ψ with respect 
to the total number of patients on maintenance. The cost of maintenance includes not just any 
material and labor costs (also included in the cost of induction and stabilization), but also any 
cost associated with establishing necessary relationships with providers of additional counseling 
                                                 
4
 For physicians paid under capitation, the prices would be equal and r would equal 1. 
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and other necessary follow-up treatment as well as any possible cost associated with inducing the 
patient to maintenance. If there exist costs from inducing patients away from maintenance (i.e., 
convincing patients that do not need it), then this would put downward pressure on ψM, but the 
model implicitly assumes that this effect is not great enough to make ψM or ψMM negative. The 
total cost function is: 
   2    2	  	 
 Combining the fixed cost components gives: 
     2	  	       (2) 
 Profit is total revenue minus total cost: 
 π   2  		    2	  	     (3) 
 The physician’s problem is to maximize profit subject to the caseload constraint 
mentioned earlier. 
 max,! 2  		    2	  	 
 s.t. %     & 0        (4) 
 The Lagrangian is: 
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 The first order conditions are:  
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4.3 KUHN-TUCKER CONDITIONS  
 Because of the inequality constraint, it is appropriate to use Kuhn-Tucker (KT) 
conditions (Kuhn & Tucker, 1951) to determine the possible solutions for q and y. The Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are: 
   3,(,4  0         (9) 
   3,(,!4  0         (10) 
 *  3,(,24  0         (11) 
 The KT conditions, combined with the definitions of q and y, give rise to eight total 
possibilities for solutions for q, y and the impact of the caseload maximum X, which are 
summarized in the table below. If λ 5 0, equations (11) and (8) imply that the caseload 
maximum is binding. 
TABLE 4.1 – The eight possibilities based on the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
Possibility Constraint on q Constraint on y Caseload maximum 
1 q ≥ 0 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 X ≥ q(1 + y) 
2 q ≥ 0 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 X = q(1 + y) 
3 q ≥ 0 y = 0 X ≥ q(1 + y) 
4 q ≥ 0 y = 0 X = q(1 + y) 
5 q = 0 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 X ≥ q(1 + y) 
6 q = 0 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 X = q(1 + y) 
7 q = 0 y = 0 X ≥ q(1 + y) 
8 q = 0 y = 0 X = q(1 + y) 
 
 Possibilities #5 – #8 all involve a solution of 0 for q. If the physician chooses to treat 0 
patients for opioid dependence then, regardless of the choice of y, the physician will also 
maintain 0 patients. This solution is uninteresting.  
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 Possibilities #3 and #4 from Table 4.1 allow for non-zero solutions for q but force 
solutions of 0 for y. This means that the physician chooses only to treat patients for induction and 
stabilization and then immediately initiates does reduction, never placing patients on a 
maintenance regimen. This is an interesting subset of physician solutions to the problem, but in 
the case of Possibility #4, it is not also mathematically interesting. In Possibility #4, the caseload 
maximum binds. This means that the physician chooses to treat the maximum number of patients 
and never maintains any; q = X. This will not lead to any testable hypotheses. Possibility #3, 
however, will. In this case, the physician chooses not to maintain any patients but also has excess 
caseload capacity. Specific solutions are discussed in the next section. 
 In Possibilities #1 and #2 from Table 4.1, the solution can involve nonzero solutions for 
both q and y, which makes them empirically interesting. These possibilities are additionally 
interesting when viewed in light of ongoing philosophical differences within the substance abuse 
treatment community. Some believe strongly in long-term medical maintenance in the treatment 
of opioid dependence, while others believe strongly that the goal for the substance-abusing 
patient ought to be complete independence from narcotics, including medications like 
buprenorphine. If these positions hold strongly enough, then even given profit considerations, it 
should be expected that physicians of the first type will choose y = 1 and eventually have an 
entire caseload of only patients on maintenance and physicians of the second type will choose y 
= 0 and never keep any patients on maintenance. Possibilities #1 and #2 concern physicians who 
choose a mixture of the two approaches. If strict ideology is not driving a physician’s choice of 
treatment style, then one challenge to the assumption of profit-maximization behavior among 
physicians is weakened.  
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 In summary, of the eight possible outcomes implied by the KT conditions necessary to 
solve the physician’s profit-maximization problem subject to an inequality constraint, this study 
will explore only the first three given in Table 4.1. 
  
4.4 RESULTS 
 The results implied by the first three possibilities from Table 4.1 are explored in the three 
subsections that follow. Each possibility yields results that apply to a specific subset of 
physicians or observations in the data. The data and the subsample creation are covered in the 
next two chapters. 
4.4.1 POSSIBILITY ONE 
 Possibility #1 has non-zero solutions to q and y with a caseload that does not bind (λ = 0). 
This means that equations (6) and (7) above are satisfied with equality to zero.  
 2  2-.    -.  2.  /  0     (12) 
   /  0         (13) 
 Equation (13) can be solved for ψM and substituted into (12), which eliminates two terms: 
 2  2-.  -.  2.  0       (14) 
 Because the caseload maximum is not binding, there is no other equation that can be used 
to find exact solutions for q and y. General solutions can be achieved from (14):  
 6  789:;7<=!	>9  and 
6  789:;:>9=>9      (15) 
 The number of patients on maintenance treatment in period 2 (m) is equal to the product 
of the number of patients stabilized in the first period (q) and the proportion of those patients 
induced to maintenance (y): m = q × y. Using the results in (15), it can be seen that: 
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 This solution for m can be evaluated for comparative statics results. The following can be 
confirmed5: 
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 where ED is the price elasticity of the demand for treatment of opioid dependence.  
 The first of these comparative statics results at first appears surprising, because it implies 
that the greater the ratio of the price of maintenance to the price of induction and stabilization, 
the fewer patients the physician would choose to place on maintenance. The key to 
understanding this result is to recall that the caseload maximum does not bind in this case. The 
physician intentionally chooses to treat fewer total patients than allowable. The marginal cost of 
another patient on maintenance is always equal to the marginal revenue from another patient on 
maintenance. Equation (13) shows that ψM = pr, and this condition eliminates most of the impact 
of r on the first order conditions for q, except for the term qryPQ in (14). This term represents the 
decrease in maintenance revenue that results from a one-unit increase in q, due to the fact that an 
increase in q pushes down p. In other words, the greater is the value of r, the greater is the rate at 
which the marginal revenue of maintenance falls as the number of patients treated increases. A 
high r magnifies the negative price effect of an increase in the number of patients treated, 
causing the physician to choose a lower value for q (new patients), which reduces m (patients 
maintained). 
                                                 
5
 The elasticity of demand (ED) for withdrawal treatment in this model is equal to p / (qPQ). Holding q constant, the 
derivative of m with respect to ED is equal to the derivative of m with respect to p / PQ. 
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 An increase in the marginal cost of induction and stabilization γQ decreases the optimal 
choice for the number of new patients q*, holding the choice for y constant, as should be 
expected. All else equal, this will drive down the optimal solution for m. 
 Physicians with more market power face demand curves that are overall less price elastic, 
which means that the value of the price elasticity of demand is higher, because it is less negative. 
Therefore, the third inequality in (17) can be interpreted as saying that the derivative of m* with 
respect to market power is negative; physicians with more market power will maintain fewer 
patients, and physicians with less market power will maintain more patients.      
 The specific hypotheses based on these results are discussed in Section 4.5.  
4.4.2 POSSIBILITY TWO 
 Possibility #2 allows for nonzero solutions for both q and y but, unlike in Possibility #1, 
with a binding caseload maximum. The fact that the caseload maximum binds means that the 
equation X = q(1 + y) can be added to equations (12) and (13) above and exact solutions for q 
and y and m can be found.  
 6  789<;=:7;:=E>9:FG>97:=	  
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 These three solutions can be evaluated for the impact of a change in the caseload 
maximum, X: 
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 This means that the physician bound by the current caseload maximum would respond to 
an increase in that caseload maximum by treating fewer new patients and keeping more patients 
on maintenance.  
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 At first glance, the reason for this may not seem obvious. One might expect that profit-
maximization should make the physician indifferent between an additional new patient or an 
additional maintenance patient, but the results in (19) contradict this intuition. A hypothetical 
example clarifies this result. Suppose a physician currently chooses to treat a certain number of 
opioid dependent patients and to maintain a certain number of those patients, such that the sum 
of the numbers of patients equals the caseload maximum, and the physician would rather have 
treated more patients total had the physician not faced the caseload maximum. If the caseload 
maximum is increased by 1, the physician can choose either to treat one more new patient or to 
maintain a long-term relationship with one additional current patient. Under what conditions will 
a physician choose an additional new or an additional maintenance patient? 
 Keeping one more patient on maintenance will increase the physician’s costs by ψM. 
Keeping one more patient on maintenance will increase the physician’s revenue by pr. So the 
marginal profit of an additional maintenance patient is pr – ψM.  
 If the physician were to fill the hypothetical 1-patient increase in the caseload maximum 
by treating a new patient (increasing q), then the costs would rise by γQ. The revenue change 
caused by this increase in q has three components. The output effect on revenue of an increase in 
q is p. The price effect on revenue of an increase in q is qPQ. This price effect of the increase in q 
also applies to the price of maintenance. The price effect in that case is qryPQ. Therefore the 
change in revenue from treating one additional new patient is p + qPQ + qryPQ. 
 The physician will prefer adding another maintenance patient to adding another new 
patient so long as: 
 pr – ψM > p + qPQ + qryPQ – γQ        (20) 
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 The third term on the right-hand side of (20) represents the price effect of an increase in 
initial induction and stabilization patients on the revenue earned from maintenance patients, 
referred to from here on as the “cross-price effect.” The only way that the physician could prefer 
to choose another new patient would be if the new-patient-specific difference between marginal 
revenue and marginal cost was sufficiently greater than the difference between marginal revenue 
and marginal cost for maintenance—i.e., large enough to make up for the cross-price effect. 
However, had this been the case, the physician’s pre-caseload-increase mix of maintenance and 
non-maintenance patients would have been inefficient, because treating more new patients, and 
maintaining fewer of them, would have yielded higher profits.  
 A profit-maximizing physician for whom another new patient is marginally more 
profitable—net of the negative cross-price effect—than another maintenance patient is not 
feasible within the model. A reduction in the number of maintenance patients and an increase in 
the number of new patients would have reduced the negative cross-price effect of an increase in 
new patients, so further increases in non-maintenance patient counts (and reductions in 
maintenance patient counts) would likewise have been profitable.  
 Stated differently, it is possible for the physician to respond to an increase in the caseload 
maximum by deciding to keep one additional patient on maintenance rather than to treat another 
new patient to avoid the negative cross-price effect, but it is not possible for a physician to 
respond to an increase in the caseload maximum with a willingness to bear the negative cross-
price effect of treating an additional new patient, because the tradeoff would have been even 
more attractive prior to the caseload maximum increase, when treating one additional new 
patient would have required reducing the number of patients on maintenance, thereby reducing 
the negative cross-price effect. 
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 Another, simpler way, to interpret this result is to say that the caseload maximum, when it 
binds and the physician treats both maintenance and non-maintenance patients, necessarily binds 
on maintenance patients. Equation (7) can be used to confirm this result. Possibility #2 from 
Table 4.1 constrains all of the first order conditions to be equal to zero. This causes λ* to take on 
the value pr – ψM. The usual interpretation of λ* is that it represents the impact of a change in the 
constraint on the value of the state variable, in this case profit. The expression pr – ψM is the 
difference between the marginal revenue and marginal cost of an additional maintenance patient, 
implying that a 1-unit change in the caseload maximum X leads only to a 1-unit change in the 
number of patients on maintenance. 
4.4.3 POSSIBILITY THREE 
 The third possibility that will be explored is the possibility that the physician chooses a 
positive number of patients for induction and stabilization, but chooses not to maintain them, 
while not reaching the caseload maximum: Possibility #3 from Table 4.1. Equation (6) from 
above holds with equality to zero, and is simplified when y and λ are set to zero. 
 
,(
,  2  2-.  2.  0        (21) 
 Equation (21) can be solved to find the profit-maximizing value for q, the number of 
patients treated: 
 6  ;:89:>9           (22) 
 The only reason for y* to be equal to zero in the absence of a binding caseload would be 
if the marginal cost of maintenance was always greater than the marginal revenue of 
maintenance. This result, that pr ≤ ψM, can also be obtained if equation (7) is evaluated under this 
set of KT conditions. 
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 Using the same definition of the price elasticity of demand for treatment of opioid 
dependence from section 4.4.1 above, the following comparative statics are achieved: 
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 Again, the second result can be read as saying that the derivative of q* with respect to 
“market power” is negative. Physicians with more market power with treat fewer patients; 
physicians with less market power will treat more. The specific hypotheses based on these results 
are discussed in the next section. 
 
4.5 HYPOTHESES 
 The three possibilities discussed in Section 4.4 lead to three distinct empirical 
experiments carried out in subsequent chapters. This section will summarize the hypotheses 
generated by the quantitative results of the model. 
4.5.1 EXPERIMENT ONE – MAINTENANCE PATIENTS 
 Based on the results derived in Section 4.4.1, the first experiment will focus on 
physicians who choose positive values for both q and y, demonstrated by a positive number of 
maintenance and non-maintenance patients, but who do not reach the maximum-allowable 
caseload. The dependent variable in Experiment #1 will be the total number of patients currently 
being maintained, m* = q* × y*. 
 It was shown in Section 4.4.1 that the total number of patients on maintenance was 
negatively related to r (the ratio of the price of maintenance to the price of induction and 
stabilization), γQ (the marginal cost of induction and stabilization treatment), and the price 
elasticity of demand for treatment of opioid dependence.   
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 There are several variables available in the data that are related to these three parameters. 
Physician specialty can be related to all three. Regarding specialty, the following hypotheses are 
advanced: 
• Specialties with low market power (facing lower, i.e., more negative, demand 
elasticity), such as internal medicine, family medicine or pediatrics, ought to have 
more patients on maintenance, relative to other specialties, all else equal. 
• Physicians specializing in psychiatry, a specialty wherein the physician is able to 
capture more maintenance revenue through psychotherapy follow-up (r is higher), 
ought to maintain fewer patients, relative to other specialties, all else equal. 
• Physicians who are certified addiction treatment specialists (or in general treat 
more patients for addiction) and who therefore face lower marginal costs for 
providing induction and stabilization treatment (both psychic and otherwise), 
ought to have more patients on maintenance, relative to physicians lacking 
addiction certification, all else equal. 
 Practice setting can also impact these parameters. 
• Physicians who practice in settings where there are other physicians may bear 
higher marginal costs of induction and stabilization, due to a negative response of 
the other physicians in the practice to the prospect of having opioid dependent 
patients frequenting the premises. Physicians in single specialty group practices or 
who practice in their own solo setting ought to maintain more patients, relative to 
physicians in other settings, all else equal. 
• Physicians who practice in hospitals, however, due to the increased availability of 
support from other types of staff (like security), may also face low marginal costs 
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for treatment of opioid dependence, and ought to maintain more patients, relative 
to physicians in other settings, all else equal.  
• Physicians who are part of an HMO are more likely to be paid based on 
capitation, which would increase the value of r to 1; these physicians ought to 
maintain fewer patients, relative to non-HMO patients, all else equal. 
 Additionally: 
• Physicians with more experience will face lower marginal costs of induction and 
stabilization treatment and therefore ought to maintain more patients, relative to 
less experienced physicians, all else equal. 
 The variable X, the caseload maximum, does not appear in the comparative statics results, 
but the maximum caseload increase in reality is a large one—from 30 to 100. It is therefore also 
hypothesized that physicians subject to the higher caseload maximum will maintain more 
patients, all else equal. A marginal increase in the caseload maximum should have no impact on 
the number of patients maintained, because the physicians in this case are not bound by the 
maximum. However, this increase is not a marginal one and a physician not bound at 100 can 
certainly treat more patients than a physician not bound at 30.  
4.5.2 EXPERIMENT TWO – RESPONSE TO CASELOAD LIMIT INCREASE 
 Possibility #2 discussed in Section 4.4.2 concerned physicians who treat positive 
numbers of maintenance and non-maintenance patients and who are bound by the caseload 
maximum. The primary result from the model in this case was that an increase in the caseload 
maximum ought to increase the number of patients on maintenance and decrease the number of 
non-maintenance patients, all else equal.  
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 It can be seen from looking at the derivative of m* with respect to X in equation (19) that 
the greater the value of the ratio of the price of maintenance to the price of induction and 
stabilization, r, the greater the positive impact of an increase in the caseload maximum on the 
number of patients on maintenance. Physicians who face a higher r (psychiatrists or physicians 
in HMOs) will have a stronger tendency to maintain more patients after an increase in X, relative 
to other patients, all else equal. 
 It is also hypothesized that the effects of an increase in the caseload maximum on the 
numbers of patients induced, stabilized, and maintained will be even stronger for physicians 
whose behavior is most likely to conform to the model of the profit-maximizing physician 
presented here, specifically non-addition-specializing physicians whose treatment decisions are 
less likely guided by ideology and more likely guided by profit maximization, as suggested in the 
model.  
4.5.3 EXPERIMENT THREE – NON-MAINTENANCE PATIENTS 
 Possibility #3, discussed in Section 4.4.3 dealt with physicians who maintain no patients, 
while not bound by the caseload maximum. It is possible that physicians who choose not to 
maintain patients do so because they are ideologically anti-maintenance. However, these 
physicians are not bound by the caseload maximum—that is, they treat fewer patients than they 
are legally allowed to treat. This makes a strict anti-maintenance and pro-withdrawal ideology 
less likely, though not impossible.  
The equations in (22) show that these physicians will treat fewer patients when the 
marginal cost of induction and stabilization treatment is higher and when the physician’s market 
power is greater. Connecting these results to variables available in the data provides the 
following testable hypotheses: 
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• Physicians in specialties of the primary-care type (internal medicine, family 
medicine, pediatrics) will treat more patients, relative to physicians in other 
specialties, all else equal, because they have less market power and the 
opportunity cost of treating a substance-abusing patient is lower. 
• Physicians in practice settings where costs of treatment are lower (solo practices, 
single-specialty group practices or hospitals) will treat more patients, relative to 
physicians in other practice settings, all else equal. 
• Physicians who are certified addiction specialists or who have significant 
experience in addiction treatment will face lower marginal costs for induction and 
stabilization and will therefore choose to treat more patients, relative to non-
addiction specialists, all else equal. 
 It is also further hypothesized that physicians subject to the higher 100-patient caseload 
maximum will report having more non-maintenance patients than do physicians subject to the 
lower 30-patient caseload maximum. The reasoning for this is the same as the reasoning 
discussed in Section 4.5.1: a marginal change in X should not be expected to have any impact, 
but a change from 30 to 100 cannot be considered marginal.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE SURVEY DATA 
5.1 THE PHYSICIAN SURVEY 
 As part of the FDA approval process for Subutex and Suboxone, Reckitt Benckiser 
Pharmaceutical is required to conduct research to track diversion and abuse. The research 
includes a quarterly survey of a random sample physicians certified to prescribe buprenorphine 
to opioid dependent patients (herein referred to as the “Physician Survey”). Physicians are 
compensated $100 for the time (about 15 – 20 minutes) that it takes to fill out the survey. 
 The Physician Survey has undergone changes since its first waves. Initially, the random 
sample of physicians was drawn from the publicly-available CSAT list of physicians certified to 
treat using buprenorphine, inclusion on which was voluntary. Starting in 2005, the sample was 
drawn instead from the DEA’s list of all certified physicians, regardless of whether they had 
opted to have their name listed on the public CSAT website. 
 Because the sample for each wave is a random sample from either the CSAT list or the 
DEA list, many physicians appear in the data multiple times. The original complete sample has 
10,873 observations over 29 survey waves from 6,739 unique physicians, with each physician 
appearing an average of 1.6 times. The earliest survey responses were recorded in November of 
2003; the most recent responses were recorded in October of 2010. 
 Most of the questions have remained unchanged in various iterations of the survey, 
though some have changed slightly. Likewise, certain waves of the survey included additional 
marketing questions of interest to Reckitt Benckiser but not necessary for FDA surveillance.  
 Access to most of the variables of the data was provided by CRS Associates, LLC, who 
manages the survey. Salvatore di Menza and Dr. Cynthia Arfken were instrumental in securing 
access and providing data. In Section 5.2, the variables used in the study are discussed. The next 
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section briefly discusses some of the limitations encountered in the survey data. The last section 
briefly discusses an additional source of data used in the study. 
 
5.2 AVAILABLE VARIABLES 
 The empirical models for Chapters 6 and 7 make use of the following variables from the 
Physician Survey. Appendix A gives the full text of the relevant questions from the Physician 
Survey.  
• Physician Specialty – respondent chooses up to 3 primary specialties from a list of 
23 choices. 
• Years Licensed to Practice Medicine – respondent indicates the whole number of 
years for which he or she has been practicing medicine. 
• Addiction Certification – respondent can indicate that he or she holds any of three 
possible addiction certifications, or can indicate that he or she holds no 
certification in addiction medicine. 
• Practice Setting – respondent chooses one of eight choices that best describes the 
setting in which he or she primarily practices. 
• Time Certified – respondent indicates the length of time for which he or she has 
been certified to treat patients with buprenorphine by choosing the range into 
which it falls. 
• Today’s Date – respondent indicates the date on which the survey was completed. 
• Percent of Practice Substance-Abusing – the respondent indicates the percentage 
of his or her time is spent treating substance abusing patients by choosing the 
range into which it falls. 
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• Total Current Buprenorphine Patients – depending on the survey wave, the 
respondent indicates the total number of patients currently on buprenorphine by 
indicating how many are on different formulations or brand names of 
buprenorphine. 
• Patients in Phases of Treatment – respondent, in some waves, indicates the 
number of patients on a “withdrawal regimen” or a “maintenance regimen”; in 
other waves, the respondent indicates the number of patients in phases 
“induction,” “maintenance,” and “dose reduction.” 
• Patients Turned Down – respondent indicates the number of patients that he or 
she has had to turn down for treatment in the last 90 days because of the federal 
patient caseload maximum. 
 In addition to these variables from the Survey instrument, the data set used also included 
coded physician IDs so multiple observations can be linked by respondent, the respondent’s state 
of residence, and the first three digits of the respondent’s zip code. 
 
5.3 SURVEY DATA LIMITATIONS 
 The most important limitation of the data from the point of view of testing the hypotheses 
generated by the algebraic model is that it does not record variables that correspond exactly to 
the model. One of the model’s two choice variables is y, the fraction of successfully-stabilized 
patients to place on maintenance treatment. The survey does not ask physicians what percentage 
of their patients are eventually placed on maintenance, but rather the total number on 
maintenance at the time that the survey is completed. In the simple specification of the model, 
these are easily disentangled because it is only a two-period model. The physicians surveyed 
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have, in most cases, been prescribing buprenorphine for multiple periods, so that observed 
patient counts do not fully reveal y. Regardless of the actual rate at which a physician places 
patients on maintenance, over time, the fraction of the caseload dedicated to maintenance 
patients should converge to 1 if y is positive. 
 Fortunately, the results of the optimization problem provide results that can be evaluated 
with respect to m, or q × y, the total number of patients on maintenance. Further experimentation 
based on this model might be hampered by the inability to accurately calculate the fraction of 
patients placed on maintenance. 
 Another very important limitation of the data is that it does not directly indicate, for each 
observation, the caseload maximum that the physician faced at the time that the survey was 
completed. Because the caseload maximum is particularly important to Experiment 2 this is a 
significant limitation. The caseload maximum is also important to the other experiments where, 
for example, unconstrained physicians who face a higher constraint will have higher patient 
counts than unconstrained physicians who face lower constraints. 
 The final limitation of the data is one that is common to all survey data, and that is that it 
is subject to respondent error. There are, for example, cases where the same physician reports in 
different waves inconsistent answers for number of years practicing medicine—for example, 
reporting fewer years practicing medicine in a later survey wave. This and other related issues 
are covered in the next chapter. 
 
5.4 SUPPLEMENTAL DEA LISTS 
 Through CRS Associates, LLC, access was provided to DEA lists of the physicians who 
have filed secondary notification of their intent to treat up to 100 patients. Because certification 
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must be renewed every three years, this data provide only the caseload maximum that the 
physician will face at the time of the expiration of their current certification. In other words, a 
date associated with a caseload limit of 100 in this data serves as an upper bound of the date on 
which the physician filed the necessary second notification of the intent to treat up to 100 
patients. This data will be used in Chapter 6 not to identify those physicians who face a caseload 
maximum of 100, but rather to identify those who certainly do not face a caseload maximum of 
100 because they fail to ever appear on this list with a caseload maximum of 100.  
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CHAPTER 6: METHODS 
6.1 SUBSAMPLE CREATION 
 The three experiments introduced in Section 4.3 all require unique subsamples of 
physicians, based on the KT conditions that gave rise to them. Those three subsamples were 
created from the same original sample, created as described below. 
 Originally, the 30-patient limit on physicians prescribing buprenorphine applied to the 
total number of patients treated in the entire group. Therefore, large health care systems were 
limited to treating 30 patients. This limit was amended in August 2005. In order to eliminate any 
observations from physicians that may have faced this “group” limit, all of the observations from 
waves 1 through 8 of the survey were deleted.  
 Where missing, states were manually filled in based on the first three digits of the zip 
codes, as reported in the data, but one observation was deleted for possessing neither piece of 
data. All observations with 0 or more than 4 reported “primary specialties” were deleted. There 
were only 4 observations of this type.   
 The following process was used to determine the practice setting for observations that 
failed to report a practice setting. The 102 observations for which practice setting was blank and 
the physician did not appear elsewhere in the data were all deleted, because there would be no 
basis for imputing the practice setting. For the rest of the observations with missing practice 
settings, the associated physicians all appeared at least one other time in the data where practice 
setting was indicated. If the physician ever reported “OTP” (“other type of practice”) as the 
practice setting, then OTP was coded for all missing observations. Otherwise, the treatment 
setting for the wave closest in wave number to the wave with the missing practice setting was 
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used as the treatment setting. All observations with practice setting indicated as “OTP” were 
deleted. 
 Several steps were taken to identify the caseload maximum faced by the physician at the 
time of observation, an imputed variable labeled X_limit. First, for any physician not ever 
appearing with a caseload of 100 on the supplemental list from the DEA, all observations were 
coded as X_limit = 30. All observations that occurred prior to December 29, 2006 were coded as 
X_limit = 30 because this is the date on which the amendment to DATA 2000 allowing 
physicians to treat up to 100 patients went into effect.  
 Physician responses to the survey question about the length of time for which the 
physician has been certified to prescribe buprenorphine (less than a year, 1 – 2 years, 3 – 4 years, 
more than 4 years) were also used. Combining these question responses with the date of the 
response, earliest and latest possible certification dates were calculated for each observation. 
Then, these earliest and latest possible certification dates were averaged for each physician. If the 
date on which an observation occurred exceeded the latest possible certification date by one year 
or more, the observation was coded as X_limit = 100—since the requirements for the caseload 
maximum of 100 require that the physician has been certified to prescribe buprenorphine for one 
year—unless the observation had already been coded as X_limit = 30. If the date on which an 
observation occurred was within one year of the earliest possible certification date, the 
observation was coded as X_limit = 30.  
 After all of the preceding coding was done, any observations for which the date of 
observation is more than one year greater than another observation for the same physician were 
coded as X_limit = 100, unless the observation was already coded as X_limit = 30. Any 
observations for which X_limit could not be imputed were deleted. 
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 Experiment #1 relates to those physicians who treat positive numbers of maintenance and 
non-maintenance patients. In the algebraic model, “non-maintenance” could only mean new 
patients; in reality, non-maintenance patients can also include patients that are in the process of 
having doses of buprenorphine reduced to withdrawal, whether or not those patients were ever 
on maintenance. The data is easily filtered for these two criteria. However, the KT conditions 
related to Experiment #1 indicate that the caseload maximum does not necessarily bind, so the 
subsample creation for Experiment #1 also requires determining which observations are 
consistent with a non-binding constraint. 
 First, the numbers of patients on Subutex and on Suboxone were summed to determine 
the relevant total number of current buprenorphine patients. In order to determine whether the 
caseload was binding, this total was compared to the imputed value for the caseload maximum 
faced at the time of observation (the variable X_limit discussed above). Physicians were 
eliminated if the total number of current buprenorphine patients was equal to or exceeded this 
imputed limit.  
 Further, observations wherein physicians reported turning away patients in the previous 
90 days due to the caseload maximum were also eliminated. There are two reasons for this. First, 
a physician might face exogenous shocks to patient numbers (if a patient moves or is jailed, for 
example) that could cause fluctuations in the number of patients receiving care that do not 
necessarily reflect the physician’s choices. If a physician usually treats exactly 100 patients, but 
happens to be at a total of only 97 at the time the survey is completed, this physician ought to be 
considered to be bound by the caseload maximum. Secondly, a caseload maximum can begin to 
alter physician behavior even before it is reached. A physician with a 97-patient caseload is 
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aware of how close she is to the caseload maximum, and that caseload maximum may bind even 
if q + m < 100. The final sample size for Experiment #1 was 2,079 observations. 
 The construction of the subsample for Experiment #2 was the most complicated. Because 
the results discussed in 4.5.3 concern how a caseload-constrained physician would respond to a 
change in caseload, the appropriate subsample includes observations where the physician: 
• faces a caseload maximum of only 30 patients, 
• reports positive numbers of both maintenance and non-maintenance patients, 
• appears to be bound by the caseload maximum of 30 patients, and 
• appears later in the data facing a higher (100-patient) caseload maximum. 
 In order to accomplish this, the imputed caseload maximum faced at the time of 
observation (the variable X_limit discussed above) was used to separate observations by the 
caseload maximum faced at the time of observation. First, the observations for which the 
imputed caseload maximum was equal to 30 were evaluated. Any of these observations where 
either the number of maintenance patients or the number of non-maintenance patients was equal 
to zero were deleted. Of these observations, only the observations where either the sum of the 
number of maintenance and the number of non-maintenance patients was equal to 30 or the 
physician reported having turned down patients in the previous 90 days were retained. The rest 
were deleted.  
 Given the selection of the appropriate 30-patient-limit observations just described, the 
data was further evaluated. Only physicians still appearing at least twice, with at least one 
observation at each caseload limit, were retained. All observations associated with other 
physicians were deleted. This led to the intermediate set of observations from the original data on 
which the subsample for Experiment #2 was based. All possible pairings of a physician’s 
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multiple observations were evaluated, and those that paired one observation with a caseload 
maximum of 30 with one observation with a caseload maximum of 100 were retained. From 
there, any pairs where the physician practice setting or physician specialty choices differed 
between the two observations were eliminated. At this point, the final sample size of 
observations for Experiment #2 (the number of “pairs” meeting the above criteria) was 80, due to 
the many restrictions on the definition of the sample. For 75 of the 80 observation pairs, the first 
observation occurred in 2006; for the other five, the first observation occurred in 2008 or 2009. 
These five observations were eliminated, so that the final sample size was 75. 
 Experiment #3, related to the third possibility derived from the KT conditions from Table 
4.1, considers observations wherein the physician chooses not to maintain any patients, while not 
reaching the caseload maximum. The creation of this subsample is straightforward. Any 
observations for which the number of patients on maintenance was non-zero were deleted. Then, 
the imputed caseload maximum (the variable X_limit discussed above) was used to eliminate any 
observations for which the total number of patients being treated was equal to the caseload 
maximum of 30 or 100. Finally, any observations for which the physician reported having turned 
patients away in the previous 90 days due to the caseload maximum were eliminated, even if the 
number of patients treated was not exactly equal to the caseload maximum. The reasoning for 
this is discussed above in the description of the Experiment #1 subsample. The final sample size 
of observations for Experiment #3 was 259.  
 
6.2 VARIABLE CREATION 
 The states indicated by the respondent—or coded based on the first three digits of the zip 
code—were used to create “region” dummy variables based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
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definition of the regions of the U.S., as follows6: Region_NE includes Maine, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; 
Region_MW includes Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas; Region_S includes Delaware, Maryland, 
District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas; 
Region_W includes Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, 
Washington, Oregon, and California; Region_Pac includes Hawaii, Alaska and Guam; 
Region_Car includes the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. In all of the regression models, the last 
two region dummies were not included, so they can be thought of as one excluded 
“Region_Other” variable. 
 Physicians who claimed to have primary specialties in internal medicine, family medicine 
or pediatrics were combined, and a dummy variable Sp_PCPtype was created and coded equal to 
1 for these physicians, because of the similarities of these physicians in terms of patient 
relationships and market power. 
 A variable called Add_Cert was created to indicate if the physician at the time of 
observation held a board certification in addiction medicine (1) or held no such certification (0). 
In the survey, the physician is directed to “mark any of these certifications in addiction 
medicine” currently held: American Board of Medical Specialties, American Society of 
Addiction Medicine, American Osteopathic Association, or “Not certified in addiction 
medicine.” If a physician chose any of the first three options, without choosing the fourth, that 
observation was coded as Add_Cert = 1. If the physician chose the fourth option either by itself 
                                                 
6
 The Census Bureau includes Hawaii and Alaska in the West Region and does not include Guam, Puerto Rico or the 
Virgin Islands. 
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or with the first or third option, that observation was coded as Add_Cert = 0. It is possible that 
the physician misread the question and only responded positively to American Board of Medical 
Specialties or American Osteopathic Association because of other non-addiction-medicine 
certifications held. If a physician responded positively to holding a board certification from the 
American Society of Addiction Medicine, the observation was coded as Add_Cert = 1, regardless 
of whether the fourth choice was also chosen. 
 
TABLE 6.1 – Average Date of Survey Completion by Wave 
Wave Average Date of Survey Completion 
9 January 10, 2006 
10 April 17, 2006 
11 July 10, 2006 
12 October 8, 2006 
13 January 7, 2007 
14 April 12, 2007 
15 July 20, 2007 
16 October 12, 2007 
17 January 18, 2008 
18 April 18, 2008 
19 July 13, 2008 
20 October 13, 2008 
21 January 10, 2009 
22 April 11, 2009 
23 July 9, 2009 
24 October 11, 2009 
25 January 11, 2010 
26 April 9, 2010 
27 July 12, 2010 
28 October 10, 2010 
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 For observations where the date of the response to the survey was missing, the average 
date for responses from the same wave was entered. The dates of responses were converted to 
serial numbers and then averaged. The average response dates for the survey waves are given in 
Table 6.1. 
 Because there were a number of inconsistencies with respect to the amount of time for 
which the physician has been practicing medicine, for each observation, the number of years 
practicing was subtracted from the date of the observation to calculate an implied date that the 
physician started practicing medicine (as if the true answer was the integer as reported). Then, 
these implied start dates were converted to a serial number and averaged for each physician. 
Then, the date of the response was compared to this average implied start date for medical 
practice to construct the variable Yrs_Practicing.  
 Some variables were created specifically for Experiment #2. Because Experiment #2 
requires looking at changes in the numbers of maintenance and non-maintenance patients given a 
change in caseload maximum, differences in these patient counts were calculated for all possible 
iso-physician, iso-practice-setting and iso-specialty combinations of one 30-patient-limit 
observation and one 100-patient-limit observation. The following independent difference 
variables were calculated: the elapsed number of years (not necessarily an integer) between the 
two observations (Time_Diff), a dummy variable indicating whether the physician reported 
turning down any positive number of patients in the second of the two observations 
(TurnDownAfter), and a dummy variable indicating the addition of a certification in addiction 
medicine between the two observations (Add_Cert_Gain). The other independent variables were 
retained from the earlier of the two observations and the variables from the latter observation 
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were deleted. Table 6.2 summarizes all of the independent variables used in the three 
experiments. 
 
TABLE 6.2 – Independent Variables 
Variable Meaning 
Sp_Addict Equals 1 if the physician indicated addiction medicine as a primary 
specialty. 
Sp_PCPtype Equals 1 if the physician indicated internal medicine, family medicine or pediatrics as a primary specialty. 
Sp_Anesth Equals 1 if the physician indicated anesthesia as a primary specialty. 
Sp_PainMed Equals 1 if the physician indicated pain medicine as a primary specialty. 
Sp_Psychiatry Equals 1 if the physician indicated psychiatry as a primary specialty. 
Add_Cert Equals 1 if the physician indicated one of three board certifications in 
addiction medicine. 
Set_Mul Equals 1 if the physician identified a multi-specialty group practice as the primary practice setting. 
Set_Sha Equals 1 if the physician identified a solo practice in a space shared with 
other physicians as the primary practice setting. 
Set_Sin Equals 1 if the physician identified a single-specialty group practice as the primary practice setting. 
Set_Sol Equals 1 if the physician identified a solo practice as the primary practice 
setting. 
Set_Sta Equals 1 if the physician identified a staff-model HMO as the primary practice setting. 
Region_W Equals 1 if the physician was located in the “West” region, as identified by the Census.  
Region_MW Equals 1 if the physician was located in the “Midwest” region, as identified by the Census. 
Region_NE Equals 1 if the physician was located in the “Northeast” region, as identified by the Census. 
Region_S Equals 1 if the physician was located in the “South” region, as identified by the Census. 
Yr2007 Equals 1 if the observation occurred in calendar year 2007. 
Yr2008 Equals 1 if the observation occurred in calendar year 2008. 
Yr2009 Equals 1 if the observation occurred in calendar year 2009. 
Yr2010 Equals 1 if the observation occurred in calendar year 2010. 
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TABLE 6.2 – Independent Variables, continued 
PercentPract 
Equals 0 if the physician indicated that 0% of the total medical practice 
was devoted to treating substance abuse patients; equals 1 if the physician 
indicated 1 – 20%; equals 2 if the physician indicated 21 – 40%; equals 3 
if the physician indicated 41 – 60%; equals 4 if the physician indicated 61 
– 80%; equals 5 if the physician indicated 81 – 100%.  
Yrs_Practicing The number of years for which the physician has been practicing medicine 
at the time of the observation. 
X_is_100 Equals 1 if the physician faced a caseload maximum of 100 patients at the time of the observation. 
Limit_MED 
Equals 1 if the physician indicated that any issues related to the medicine 
itself represent limitations associated with buprenorphine maintenance 
treatment. 
Limit_FIN 
Equals 1 if the physician indicated that any issues related to financial 
considerations represent limitations associated with buprenorphine 
maintenance treatment.  
Independent variables specific to Experiment #2 
Time_Diff Equals the number of years (not necessarily an integer) elapsed between the two observations. 
Add_Cert_Gain 
Equals 1 if the physician indicated holding one of three board 
certifications in addiction medicine in the second, but not first, of the two 
observations. 
TurnDownAfter 
Equals 1 if the physician indicated turning down any positive number of 
patients due to the caseload maximum in the second of the two 
observations. 
 
 The creation of the dependent variables was relatively straightforward. In some survey 
waves, the physician was asked directly about the number of patients on “Withdrawal” or 
“Maintenance” regimens, so for these waves, the simple answer to the latter question was 
retained as the number of maintenance patients. This number was subtracted from the number of 
total current buprenorphine patients (the sum of the number of patients on Subutex and the 
number of patients on Suboxone) to determine the number of non-maintenance patients. In other 
survey waves, the stages of treatment from which the physician could choose were given as 
“Induction,” “Maintenance” or “Dose Tapering.” The number of patients in the maintenance 
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phase was retained without change. Induction implies that the patient is in the first stage of 
treatment. Dose tapering can occur at the end of induction and stabilization or, sometimes, at the 
end of an extended period of time on maintenance. Most importantly, however, dose tapering 
indicates that the physician does not intend to further maintain a long-term relationship with this 
patient, regardless of the past history between patient and physician, so the number of patients in 
the “dose tapering” phase of treatment was combined with the number of patients in the 
“induction” phase of treatment to determine the number of non-maintenance patients. Two 
variables were created for every observation: MainCurr, the current number of patients being 
maintained, and NonMCurr, the current number of non-maintenance patients. 
 For Experiment #1, the dependent variable is MainCurr; for Experiment #3, the 
dependent variable is NonMCurr. In both cases, the natural log of these patient counts were also 
calculated, and labeled ln_MainCurr and ln_NonMCurr. For Experiment #2, the dependent 
variables under consideration are both the difference in maintenance patients between 
observations and the difference in non-maintenance patients between observations, Main_diff 
and NonM_diff. Natural logs cannot be computed because in some cases the difference is 
negative or zero.  
 Table 6.3 below gives the mean and standard deviation for all of the variables (dependent 
and independent) that entered into the regression for Experiment #1. As seen in Table 6.3, for 
Experiment #1, 46% of the respondents indicated a primary-care-type specialty, and 37% 
reported psychiatry as a primary specialty. Thirty-eight percent reported holding a certification in 
addiction medicine. The most popular practice setting was a solo practice (about 45%), followed 
by a single-specialty group practice (21%). Observations were distributed relatively well across 
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regions and years. Only slightly more than half of the observations (53%) were observations 
where the physician likely faced a caseload maximum of 100 patients at the time of observation. 
TABLE 6.3 – Descriptive Statistics for Experiment #1 
Variable Mean St. Dev. 
MainCurr 18.9505 18.2084 
ln_MainCurr 2.4238 1.1195 
Sp_Addict 0.2790 0.4486 
Sp_PCPtype 0.4613 0.4986 
Sp_Anesth 0.0245 0.1547 
Sp_CommHealth 0.0034 0.0579 
Sp_Neurology 0.0115 0.1068 
Sp_PainMed 0.1174 0.3219 
Sp_Psychiatry 0.3733 0.4838 
Add_Cert 0.3805 0.4856 
Set_Mul 0.0976 0.2969 
Set_Sha 0.1025 0.3033 
Set_Sin 0.2145 0.4106 
Set_Sol 0.4459 0.4972 
Set_Sta 0.0067 0.0818 
Region_W 0.2136 0.4099 
Region_MW 0.1837 0.3874 
Region_NE 0.3155 0.4648 
Region_S 0.2795 0.4488 
Yr2007 0.1015 0.3021 
Yr2008 0.2468 0.4312 
Yr2009 0.2742 0.4462 
Yr2010 0.2458 0.4307 
PercentPract 2.8942 1.2961 
Yrs_Practicing 20.3427 10.9309 
X_is_100 0.5310 0.4992 
Limit_MED 0.1448 0.3520 
Limit_FIN 0.7730 0.4190 
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 Table 6.4 below provides descriptive statistics for the 75 observations associated with 
Experiment #2. The mean difference for both patient types is positive, which indicates that, at 
least on average, physicians who face a higher caseload maximum treat more maintenance and 
non-maintenance patients. The three specialties represented in the data are all well-represented. 
Just over half of the physicians (about 53%) are certified in addiction medicine at the time of the 
first observation. Most of the observations are for physicians in solo practices (59%).   
 
 TABLE 6.4 - Descriptive Statistics for Experiment #2 
Variable Mean St. Dev. 
NonM_diff 6.3200 15.7593 
Main_diff 24.1733 25.4704 
Sp_Addict 0.4933 0.5033 
Sp_PCPtype 0.4800 0.5030 
Sp_Psychiatry 0.3200 0.4696 
Time_Diff 2.7237 1.0420 
Add_Cert_Gain 0.0667 0.2511 
Add_Cert 0.5333 0.5022 
Set_Sin 0.1067 0.3108 
Set_Sol 0.5867 0.4957 
Set_Sta 0.0267 0.1622 
Region_W 0.1467 0.3562 
Region_MW 0.2800 0.4520 
Region_NE 0.3467 0.4791 
PercentPract 3.5467 1.6627 
Yrs_Practicing 19.6785 9.5725 
TurnDownAfter 0.2533 0.4378 
Limit_MED 0.0267 0.1622 
Limit_FIN 0.7600 0.4300 
 
65 
 
 
 
 Table 6.5 below provides descriptive statistics for Experiment #3. The table shows that 
addiction specialty, primary-care type specialties and psychiatry are the most popular, having 
been selected by 36%, 39% and 42% of the responding physicians respectively. About 42% of 
the physicians hold a board certification in addiction medicine. Solo practices were the most 
frequent (29%), followed by single-specialty group practices (19%). About a third of the 
observations come from 2006 or 2007, and the other two-thirds come from 2008 – 2010.  
 Only 18.5% of the observations in Experiment #3 occurred under an imputed caseload 
maximum of 100 patients, which is significantly lower than Experiment #1’s 53%. This 
underscores the possibility that physicians operating under a caseload maximum of 100 are likely 
to treat maintenance and non-maintenance patients. A subsample of physicians that chooses not 
to maintain patients is more likely going to include physicians that face a caseload maximum of 
30. It could also be that this sample is self-selecting. Physicians who do not plan on maintaining 
patients are less likely to perform a second notification in order to treat up to 100 patients. 
 
6.3 ECONOMETRIC METHODS 
 Due to the panel nature of the survey data, it is possible that the errors in the data are not 
independent and identically-distributed, a requirement of ordinary least squares estimation. 
Though it has been argued (Gujarati, 2009) that the existence of heteroskedasticity impacts only 
the standard errors (and thus inferences) of a regression model, without impacting the coefficient 
estimates, Goodman and Thibodeau (1995) have pointed out that inaccurate characterization of 
the variance can lead to parameter estimates that are likewise inaccurate. For the sake of accurate 
parameter estimates and proper inference, the possibility of heteroskedasticity was explored for 
the data in all three experiments. 
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TABLE 6.5 - Descriptive Statistics for Experiment #3 
Variable Mean St. Dev. 
NonMCurr 6.6641 10.6883 
ln_NonMCurr 1.2394 1.0873 
Sp_Addict 0.3591 0.4807 
Sp_PCPtype 0.3861 0.4878 
Sp_Anesth 0.0232 0.1507 
Sp_PainMed 0.0656 0.2481 
Sp_Psychiatry 0.4170 0.4940 
Add_Cert 0.4170 0.4940 
Set_Mul 0.0734 0.2612 
Set_Sha 0.0463 0.2106 
Set_Sin 0.1853 0.3893 
Set_Sol 0.2934 0.4562 
Set_Sta 0.0309 0.1733 
Region_W 0.2394 0.4275 
Region_MW 0.1506 0.3583 
Region_NE 0.2934 0.4562 
Region_S 0.3050 0.4613 
Yr2007 0.0965 0.2959 
Yr2008 0.2124 0.4098 
Yr2009 0.2355 0.4251 
Yr2010 0.2317 0.4227 
PercentPract 3.4440 1.6518 
Yrs_Practicing 21.5844 12.3569 
X_is_100 0.1853 0.3893 
Limit_MED 0.2432 0.4299 
Limit_FIN 0.6255 0.4849 
 
 Standard White tests (White, 1980) for heteroskedasticity were performed for the data 
used in all of the Experiments, and the results are given in Tables 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 below. To 
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perform the White test, the squared residuals from an OLS estimation of the data are regressed 
against all of the regressors (and cross-products of the regressors) from the original equation. 
Then, the LM statistic is calculated as n × R2, where n is the number of observations and R2 is the 
R2 from the second regression of the squared residuals. This statistic has a χ2 distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors in the auxiliary squared residuals equation 
minus one.  
 The null hypothesis of the White test is that there is no heteroskedasticity. One compares 
the LM test statistic to the critical χ2 value and rejects the null hypothesis if the LM statistic is 
greater than the critical value. In other words, if the LM statistic is higher than the critical value, 
then the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity can be rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis that the data display heteroskedasticity. 
 
TABLE 6.6 – White test for Heteroskedasticity for the data from Experiment #1 
Dependent 
variable 
specification 
n 
R2 of auxiliary 
regression 
LM test 
statistic DF 
Critical χ2 
value at 10% 
Critical χ2 
value at 5% 
Natural log of 
patient count 
2,080 0.1125 234.0 248 276.9 285.7 
Result: The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity cannot be rejected. 
Patient count 
2,080 0.2425 504.4 248 276.9 285.7 
Result: The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity can be rejected at the 5% 
confidence level. There is sufficient reason to believe that heteroskedasticity 
exists. 
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TABLE 6.7 – White test for Heteroskedasticity for the data from Experiment #2 
Dependent 
variable n 
R2 of auxiliary 
regression 
LM test 
statistic DF 
Critical χ2 
value at 10% 
Critical χ2 
value at 5% 
Difference in 
Non-Maintenance 
Patients 
75 0.9013 67.5975 69 84.42 89.39 
Result: The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity cannot be rejected. 
Difference in 
Maintenance 
Patients 
75 0.9336 70.0200 69 84.42 89.39 
Result: The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity cannot be rejected. 
 
 
TABLE 6.8 – White test for Heteroskedasticity for the data from Experiment #3 
Dependent 
variable 
specification 
n 
R2 of auxiliary 
regression 
LM test 
statistic DF 
Critical χ2 
value at 10% 
Critical χ2 
value at 5% 
Natural log of 
patient count 
259 0.3719 213.9757 184 209.0 216.6 
Result: The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity can be rejected at the 10% 
confidence level, but not at the 5% level. There is some reason to believe that 
heteroskedasticity exists. 
Patient count 
259 0.5767 227.9718 184 209.0 216.6 
Result: The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity can be rejected at the 5% 
confidence level. There is sufficient reason to believe that heteroskedasticity 
exists. 
 
 
 Ordinarily, the number of regressors in the auxiliary regression would be equal to (k2 + 
3k)/2, where k is the number of regressors in the original OLS regression. In these cases, 
however, the number of regressors in each auxiliary regression is smaller than this for two 
reasons, both related to the binary nature of many of the independent variables. The square of a 
binary variable would not be a unique variable, so it would not be included. Also, the cross-
products of many of the regressors were eliminated by the statistical software for creating 
variables that were either not unique or were linear combinations of other variables. The degrees 
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of freedom reported in the tables above are based on the number of regressors that the statistical 
software used in the regression.  
 The results of the White tests on the data for Experiment #1 (Table 6.6) were mixed; 
heteroskedasticity appears to be present in the data if the dependent variable is simply patient 
count, but not if the dependent variable is the natural log of patient count.  
 The results for the White test on the data for Experiment #2 (Table 6.7) require some 
explanation. Because of the regrettably low number of observations for Experiment #2 (due to 
the restrictive definition of the subsample based on the KT conditions) and the fact that the 
number of regressors in the auxiliary regression is relatively high, rejection of the null hypothesis 
of no heteroskedasticity is mathematically impossible. The upper bound of the LM test statistic is 
75—and the calculated test statistic is near to this upper bound—but the critical χ2 values are 
84.42 and 89.39. For this reason, though the alternative hypothesis of heteroskedasticity is not 
statistically accepted, the possibility of heteroskedasticity, and the need to correct it, will not be 
entirely ruled out.  
 The results for the White test on the data for Experiment 3 (Table 6.8) confirm that 
heteroskedasticity is likely present in the sample data. This offers further support that 
heteroskedasticity could exist in the data for the first two experiments. 
 Because of the mixed or ambiguous results in some cases above, the regression analysis 
was performed using a number of approaches to correcting for heteroskedasticity, and the results 
from these approaches will be reported. One simple approach to correcting for heteroskedasticity 
is to calculate what are known as heteroskedasticity-consistent (or “White”) standard errors. The 
statistical software makes this task very simple. It calculates new standard errors so that proper 
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inferences can be made, but parameter estimates are identical to those that would be achieved 
through regular OLS estimation. 
 One other approach to correcting for heteroskedasticity is the one used by Goodman and 
Thibodeau (1995), which comes from Davidian and Carroll (1987). This approach requires 
iterative regressions. First, OLS methods are used to estimate the original regression equation, 
and the residuals are retained. Then, the absolute values of these residuals are regressed against 
variables from the original equation that are thought to be related to the heteroskedasticity. From 
this second regression, predicted values of the dependent variable (absolute values of residuals) 
are retained. These inverses of these predicted values are then used as weights in a weighted least 
squares estimation of the original regression. This process is iterated until the parameter 
estimates of the weighted least squares estimations converge and fail to be improved by further 
iterations. 
 So for each of the three experiments, three sets of results are given: simple OLS estimates 
with unadjusted standard errors, OLS estimates with White standard errors, and the weighted 
least squares estimates from the final converged regression based on the iterative approach 
suggested by Davidian and Carroll (1987). 
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CHAPTER 7: RESULTS 
7.1 RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT #1 ON MAINTENANCE PATIENTS 
 Experiment #1 focused on the number of patients maintained on buprenorphine by 
physicians who reported having both maintenance and non-maintenance patients but who did not 
treat the maximum allowable number of patients. The empirical results from Experiment #1, 
which had 2,080 observations, are given in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 below. Table 7.1 provides the 
results for the specification that used the patient count as the dependent variable; Table 7.2 
provides the results for the specification that used the natural log of the patient count as the 
dependent variables. In both cases, the region dummy coefficients should be interpreted relative 
to the excluded regions—Pacific and the Caribbean. The year dummy coefficients should be 
interpreted relative to the excluded year, 2006. The practice setting dummy variable coefficients 
should be interpreted relative to a hospital setting, the setting which was not included. Finally, 
the X_is_100 variable coefficients are relative to a caseload limit of 30. 
 Section 4.5.1 gave the hypotheses for Experiment #1. With respect to specialty, it was 
hypothesized that physicians with PCP-type specialties would be expected to have more patients 
on maintenance, relative to physicians in other specialties; physicians with psychiatry as a 
primary specialty would be expected to have fewer patients on maintenance, relative to 
physicians in other specialties; and physicians who are addiction specialists, certified in 
addiction medicine, or devote more of their practice to treating substance abusing patients would 
be expected to have more patients on maintenance, relative to other physicians. 
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 TABLE 7.1 – Patient Count Results from Experiment #1 
Dependent variable: Current Maintenance Patients, MainCurr 
n =2,079 
Ordinary Least Squares Weighted Least Squares 
R2: 0.3640 Adj. R2: 0.3559 R2: 0.428 Adj. R2: 0.4208 
Independent 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
White 
Standard 
Error 
Parameter 
Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept -4.6175 4.2172 2.8757 0.5553 2.6732 
Sp_Addict 1.3416 0.8765 0.8970 0.7526 0.6815 
Sp_PCPtype 1.8228 1.0869* 1.1574 1.6764 0.8577* 
Sp_Anesth -2.5694 2.2611 1.6487 -1.3372 1.3072 
Sp_CommHealth 1.8790 5.6020 4.3185 1.6919 4.1856 
Sp_Neurology -1.0894 3.0759 2.1334 -2.3333 1.7950 
Sp_PainMed 0.9934 1.2251 1.2407 0.3405 0.9182 
Sp_Psychiatry -2.7136 1.0746** 1.1203** -1.4460 0.8298* 
Add_Cert 0.8857 0.7222 0.7067 0.8565 0.5481 
Set_Mul 1.6358 1.3904 1.3216 0.6147 0.9850 
Set_Sha 0.5329 1.3873 1.2913 0.3062 0.9993 
Set_Sin 1.7592 1.1659 1.0625* 1.2406 0.8353 
Set_Sol 0.8288 1.0634 0.9687 0.1709 0.7463 
Set_Sta 2.2028 4.0739 4.9689 0.8469 3.4745 
Region_W 4.1337 3.7859 2.3138* 1.2937 2.2897 
Region_MW 5.2016 3.8011 2.3563** 1.9849 2.3084 
Region_NE 6.3479 3.7716* 2.2646*** 2.7522 2.2679 
Region_S 5.1203 3.7647 2.2624** 1.7229 2.2600 
Yr2007 -2.4553 1.4449* 1.2410** -1.5606 1.0588 
Yr2008 -0.9776 1.1917 0.7634 -0.4559 0.7696 
Yr2009 1.1283 1.1783 0.7410 0.2700 0.7695 
Yr2010 0.8537 1.1779 0.7349 0.4239 0.7550 
PercentPract 1.5224 0.3172*** 0.3328*** 1.2319 0.2576*** 
Yrs_Practicing 0.0516 0.0303* 0.0305* 0.0256 0.0230 
X_is_100 19.8056 0.7321*** 0.6314*** 19.7569 0.5996*** 
Limit_MED -2.7867 0.9197*** 0.9031*** -1.1430 0.6839* 
Limit_FIN 1.4670 0.7894* 0.7635* 1.1530 0.5752** 
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
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 Some of these hypotheses are confirmed by the empirical results. The patient-count 
specification reported in Table 7.1 confirms that the coefficient on Sp_PCPtype is positive and 
statistically significant in two of the three regressions. Sp_Psychiatry is negative and statistically 
significant in all three regressions. Though Sp_Addict and Add_Cert fail to rise to statistical 
significance in any of the regressions, they both have the right sign. Most importantly, 
PercentPract is positive and statistically significant in all three regressions. 
 Turning to the natural-log specifications reported in Table 7.2, the variable Sp_PCPtype 
is again positive and statistically significant in all three regressions. A physician in a primary-
care-type specialty keeps 14% to 15% more patients on maintenance than does a physician not in 
one of these specialties. In the natural log specification, the impact of a psychiatry specialty is 
not statistically significant at all. The variable related to the percentage of a physician’s practice 
dedicated to substance abuse patients is positive and statistically significant. Simply interpreted, 
a 20% increase in the amount of his or her practice a physician dedicates to substance abuse 
leads to a 9% increase in the number of patients treated through maintenance. 
 In general, the empirical results confirm the hypothesized effects of physician specialty 
on the number of patients a physician will keep on maintenance: addiction specialists and 
physicians with low market power will keep more patients on maintenance; there is limited 
evidence that psychiatrists will keep fewer patients on maintenance. 
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TABLE 7.2 – Natural Log of Patient Count Results from Experiment #1  
Dependent variable: Natural Log of Current Maintenance Patients, ln_MainCurr 
n = 2,079 
Ordinary Least Squares Weighted Least Squares 
R2: 0.3770 Adj. R2: 0.3691 R2: 0.3829 Adj. R2: 0.375 
Independent 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
White 
Standard 
Error 
Parameter 
Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 1.0782 0.2566*** 0.2302*** 1.0742 0.2413*** 
Sp_Addict 0.0657 0.0533 0.0525 0.0680 0.0526 
Sp_PCPtype 0.1303 0.0661** 0.0656** 0.1360 0.0654** 
Sp_Anesth -0.0717 0.1376 0.1203 -0.0800 0.1229 
Sp_CommHealth 0.3552 0.3409 0.2398 0.3102 0.2951 
Sp_Neurology -0.0630 0.1872 0.1814 -0.0653 0.1878 
Sp_PainMed 0.0567 0.0745 0.0705 0.0696 0.0721 
Sp_Psychiatry -0.1025 0.0654 0.0647 -0.1021 0.0648 
Add_Cert 0.0595 0.0439 0.0438 0.0583 0.0436 
Set_Mul 0.0975 0.0846 0.0819 0.0962 0.0837 
Set_Sha -0.0103 0.0844 0.0852 -0.0053 0.0850 
Set_Sin 0.0811 0.0709 0.0697 0.0865 0.0707 
Set_Sol 0.0266 0.0647 0.0626 0.0213 0.0643 
Set_Sta -0.0621 0.2479 0.2702 -0.0433 0.2642 
Region_W 0.1771 0.2304 0.2095 0.1656 0.2134 
Region_MW 0.2299 0.2313 0.2102 0.2190 0.2142 
Region_NE 0.3404 0.2295 0.2080 0.3286 0.2121 
Region_S 0.2114 0.2291 0.2071 0.1989 0.2119 
Yr2007 -0.2127 0.0879** 0.0915** -0.2072 0.0908** 
Yr2008 -0.0940 0.0725 0.0718 -0.0869 0.0735 
Yr2009 -0.0014 0.0717 0.0710 0.0117 0.0722 
Yr2010 0.0146 0.0717 0.0701 0.0221 0.0719 
PercentPract 0.0843 0.0193*** 0.019*** 0.0853 0.0190*** 
Yrs_Practicing 0.0010 0.0018 0.0018 0.0009 0.0018 
X_is_100 1.2769 0.0446*** 0.0442*** 1.2801 0.0443*** 
Limit_MED -0.1502 0.056*** 0.0593** -0.1512 0.0572*** 
Limit_FIN 0.1491 0.048*** 0.0493*** 0.1502 0.0494*** 
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
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 In both specifications—patient count (Table 7.1) and natural log (Table 7.2), practice 
setting fails to have any noticeable impact. The only exception is that the coefficient associated 
with a single-specialty group practice is positive and statistically significant in the OLS 
specification using White standard errors with patient-count as the dependent variable (Table 
7.1). It was hypothesized in Section 4.5.1 that physicians in solo practices or single-specialty 
group practices, where there is less potential for external costs to spill over into unrelated 
practices, would be expected to keep more patients on maintenance. This one significant 
coefficient is consistent with that hypothesis. 
 It was hypothesized that physicians with more years of experience would be expected to 
keep more patients on maintenance. Table 7.1 reports that the coefficient on the variable 
Yrs_Practicing is positive and statistically significant in the OLS specification, regardless of the 
standard errors employed. Another two years of experience leads to one additional maintenance 
patient, on average. 
 In the patient-count OLS specifications (Table 7.1), some of the region variables were 
also statistically significant. There were no hypotheses regarding these variables, but it is 
interesting to note that this implies that physicians in the continental U.S. keep more patients on 
maintenance than do other U.S. physicians. The variable for Yr2007 was also statistically 
significant for five of the six total specifications. Its sign is negative, indicating that physicians 
kept fewer patients on maintenance in 2007 than in 2006. There is no obvious explanation for 
why this might have been. 
 The two included variables that reflect physician attitudes are also statistically significant. 
This is so for all of the specifications. The natural-log specification (Table 7.2) provides the best 
interpretation of the results. When the physician views the medicine itself as a limitation, the 
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number of patients on maintenance falls by 14%; when the physician views financial issues, such 
as reimbursement, as limitations, the number of patients on maintenance is higher by 16%. This 
latter result could be the result of endogeneity, suggesting that physicians who maintain a higher 
number of patients are more likely to run into the financial issues surrounding the use of 
buprenorphine. At the very least, this result suggests that financial issues are not sufficient to 
prevent physicians from using buprenorphine to treat patients. 
 The dummy variable X_is_100 is positive and statistically significant in all six 
specifications. This means that physicians who face a caseload maximum of 100 patients, rather 
than just 30, kept more patients on maintenance. In fact, Table 7.2 confirms that when the patient 
caseload maximum is 100 rather than 30, the number of patients kept on maintenance increases 
by about 260%. 
 The empirical results of Experiment #1, which focused on the number of maintenance 
patients for physicians with patients of both types, generally confirm the results predicted by the 
algebraic model presented in Chapter 4. Physician specialty is related to market power and 
opportunity cost as hypothesized in Chapter 4: physicians in primary-care type specialties and 
physicians who specialize in addiction treatment keep more patients on maintenance relative to 
other physicians; psychiatrists keep fewer patients on maintenance. There is limited evidence 
that practice setting affects treatment costs. Experience practicing medicine reduces opportunity 
costs of treating patients for substance abuse, and more experienced physicians treat more 
patients. Most notably, physicians keep more than 3.5 times as many patients on maintenance 
treatment when the caseload maximum increases to 3.33 times the lower 30-patient limit.    
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7.2 RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT #2 ON RESPONSE TO CASELOAD LIMIT 
INCREASE 
 The empirical results from Experiment #2 are given in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 below. 
Experiment #2 focused on the differences in the numbers of maintenance and non-maintenance 
patients for physicians who appear to be bound by the federal caseload maximum. In essence, 
this experiment tested most directly the impact of the change in the caseload maximum on 
physician treatment choices. The variable Region_South was omitted. Due to the very small 
number of observations, many specialties were omitted.  
 The very small sample size (n = 75) prevented this experiment from yielding substantial 
results. Table 7.3 focuses on the difference in non-maintenance patients. Non-maintenance 
patients include new patients in the induction and stabilization phases of treatment as well as 
patients being withdrawn from buprenorphine. The coefficient on the variable Sp_PCPtype is 
positive and statistically significant in one of three specifications. This result suggests that a 
physician in one of these specialties will have almost 7 more non-maintenance patients after an 
increase in the maximum allowable caseload from 30 to 100. Table 7.3 also reports that 
psychiatrists increase the number of non-maintenance patients by 10 after an increase in the 
caseload maximum. Likewise, the coefficient on the variable Set_Sin, which indicates a single-
specialty group practice, is positive and statistically significant. These physicians increase non-
maintenance caseloads by 16.9 to 17.9 patients in response to the caseload maximum increase. 
These results do not conform to the prediction generated by the algebraic model that the number 
of non-maintenance patients should decrease. This discrepancy could be due to the fact that an 
increase from 30 to 100 represents much more than a marginal increase, so that had the limit 
increased only by a few patients, the algebraic model would be more relevant. 
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TABLE 7.3 – Non-Maintenance Patients Difference Results from Experiment #2 
Dependent variable: The difference in non-maintenance patients between observations, 
NonM_diff 
n = 75 
Ordinary Least Squares Weighted Least Squares 
R2: 0.2815 Adj. R2: 0.0672 R2: 0.2814 Adj. R2: 0.0671 
Independent 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
White 
Standard 
Error 
Parameter 
Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept -9.4865 11.8888 10.2594 -8.0099 11.7294 
Sp_Addict 5.8353 5.1419 3.7658 6.8541 4.7945 
Sp_PCPtype 6.8875 4.7898 3.6281* 6.3691 4.6468 
Sp_Psychiatry 10.2896 5.1701* 3.9710** 10.2073 4.7839** 
Time_Diff 1.1783 1.8350 1.6777 0.4541 1.7643 
Add_Cert_Gain 9.1702 8.1560 8.7051 6.5676 8.0527 
Add_Cert 0.7293 4.9898 4.2770 0.2572 4.7754 
Set_Sin 17.8606 8.0488** 9.0987* 16.8705 7.5820** 
Set_Sol 5.7299 4.9673 3.4955 6.4812 4.7227 
Set_Sta 4.5977 13.2435 8.2844 5.2028 12.2350 
Region_W 9.8566 7.5182 6.7491 10.0510 7.4877 
Region_MW -2.0078 6.2128 4.6478 -1.5597 6.2296 
Region_NE 3.5095 5.3772 5.1896 3.8978 5.4687 
PercentPract -0.0245 1.5920 1.2541 -0.2101 1.5418 
Yrs_Practicing 0.1962 0.2327 0.2158 0.1646 0.2335 
TurnDownAfter 4.3206 4.6059 4.2064 4.9112 4.4787 
Limit_MED -3.4982 12.8477 12.5874 -1.3093 13.1158 
Limit_FIN -13.3488 4.6928*** 4.1454*** -11.8666 4.5414** 
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
 
 While physicians in primary-care type specialties and psychiatrists are not alike with 
respect to market power, they may be alike with respect to marginal treatment costs. For primary 
care physicians, the opportunity cost of treating opioid dependence may be low since they often 
treat a wide range of a patient’s health-related problems. For psychiatrists, training may reduce 
the marginal cost of providing medication-assisted opioid dependence treatment. The lower 
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marginal costs of treatment may explain why these physicians increase their patient counts so 
dramatically relative to physicians in other specialties. If lower marginal costs of treatment are 
also the reason for the positive coefficient on Set_Sin, then this could reveal that in single-
specialty group practices where buprenorphine treatment is being provided, there is consensus 
about and openness to treating opioid dependence, so the possibility for external costs to spill 
over onto other physicians is low. 
 Interestingly, Table 7.3 reports that the coefficient on Limit_FIN is statistically 
significant in all three specifications and negative. This means that physicians who reported that 
the financial issues—such as third party reimbursement—presented significant limitations to the 
use of buprenorphine had fewer non-maintenance patients (between 11.9 and 13.3 fewer) after 
the increase in the caseload maximum, compared to before the increase. So while Experiment #1 
above suggested that financial considerations may not be enough to prevent physicians from 
maintaining a high number of patients, this result suggests that, over time, these issues can cause 
physicians to reduce the number of non-maintenance patients. 
 Turning to the results for the difference in the number of maintenance patients (Table 
7.4), the most substantial result is the positive coefficient on the Sp_PCPtype variable, which is 
statistically significant with or without corrections for heteroskedasticity. The results suggest that 
physicians in internal medicine, family medicine or pediatrics keep between 18.7 and 19.5 
additional patients on maintenance after an increase in the caseload maximum. The coefficient 
on Sp_Psychiatry is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that psychiatrists keep 
about 15 more patients on maintenance after an increase in the caseload maximum. This 
conforms to the hypothesis from Section 4.5.2 that the number of maintenance patients would be 
expected to increase after an increase in the caseload maximum. 
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TABLE 7.4 – Maintenance Patients Difference Results from Experiment #2  
Dependent variable: The difference in maintenance patients between observations, Main_diff 
n = 75 
Ordinary Least Squares Weighted Least Squares 
R2: 0.4057 Adj. R2: 0.2284 R2: 0.4090 Adj. R2: 0.2327 
Independent 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
White 
Standard 
Error 
Parameter 
Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept -21.3940 17.4757 14.8984 -22.4462 17.2429 
Sp_Addict -3.7654 7.5583 6.3864 -3.1172 7.4343 
Sp_PCPtype 18.7017 7.0406** 6.9477*** 19.5343 7.0526*** 
Sp_Psychiatry 15.1681 7.5996* 6.7083** 15.0369 7.4286** 
Time_Diff 7.4668 2.6973*** 2.6320*** 7.3420 2.6852*** 
Add_Cert_Gain 3.4214 11.9888 7.6566 3.6423 11.5307 
Add_Cert -1.8874 7.3347 6.3219 -1.9010 7.2513 
Set_Sin -3.0160 11.8311 8.8848 -2.2283 11.4615 
Set_Sol -0.1373 7.3017 7.1762 0.4200 7.0994 
Set_Sta -8.4349 19.4670 10.6289 -8.7697 19.5106 
Region_W -16.8043 11.0513 10.7311 -15.6269 10.8789 
Region_MW -10.2283 9.1324 9.7454 -11.0882 9.1349 
Region_NE -12.6937 7.9042 7.9867 -12.7439 7.9479 
PercentPract -0.0868 2.3401 1.8473 0.2241 2.3526 
Yrs_Practicing 1.0527 0.3421*** 0.3321*** 1.0108 0.3430*** 
TurnDownAfter 7.4130 6.7704 7.2795 7.8099 6.6598 
Limit_MED -0.3607 18.8853 11.7735 1.0098 18.4480 
Limit_FIN 2.7843 6.8982 4.9328 2.7500 6.7685 
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
 
 Additionally, these two positive physician-specialty results are consistent with the results 
from the non-maintenance side of this experiment (in Table 7.3) with two notable differences. 
First, the magnitudes of the coefficients are greater in Table 7.4. This means that, while these 
physicians increase their non-maintenance and maintenance caseloads after an increase in the 
maximum total caseload, the increases in maintenance are greater. This is partially in line with 
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the predictions of the algebraic model that maintenance caseloads should increase and non-
maintenance caseloads should decrease. Second, the coefficient on Sp_PCPtype is the greater of 
the two in Table 7.4 and the smaller of the two in Table 7.3. This means that the non-
maintenance versus maintenance differential is greater for primary-care physicians. After the 
increase in the caseload maximum, psychiatrists add to their caseloads about 1.5 maintenance 
patients for every non-maintenance patient, but physicians in primary-care type specialties 
(internal medicine, family medicine, pediatrics) add almost 3 maintenance patients for every 
added non-maintenance patient. 
 The variable Time_Diff has a positive and statistically significant in all three 
specifications. This simply reflects the time needed to acquire more patients and to move them 
from induction and stabilization to maintenance. For each additional year (quarter) between 
observations, the physician’s maintenance caseload increased by about 7.4 patients (1.9 patients). 
 Finally, the coefficient on the variable Yrs_Practicing is positive and statistically 
significant in all three specifications. For every year of experience, a physician adds another 1 
maintenance patient as a result of a caseload maximum increase from 30 to 100. The mean 
number of years of experience in this experiment (see Table 6.4) was 19.7.   
 The primary result of the algebraic model was that the number of non-maintenance 
patients should fall, and the number of maintenance patients should rise, after an increase in the 
caseload maximum. These conclusions would have been most strongly supported by a negative 
and statistically significant intercept for the NonM_diff model (Table 7.3), and a positive and 
statistically significant intercept for the Main_diff model (Table 7.4). Both intercepts were 
calculated to be negative and neither was statistically significant. However, it should be noted 
that the estimated coefficients on the variables such as Sp_PCPtype, Sp_Psychiatry, TimeDiff 
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and, most importantly, Yrs_Practicing in the Main_diff model are large enough in magnitude to 
cause the change in the number of patients on maintenance to be positive, even in spite of the 
negative intercept. So for many physicians, a higher caseload maximum leads to more patients 
on maintenance.  
 
7.3 RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT #3 ON NON-MAINTENANCE PATIENTS 
 The empirical results from Experiment #3 are given in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 below. 
Experiment #3, with a sample size of 259 observations, focused on physicians who reported 
having no patients on maintenance but treated fewer non-maintenance patients than the federal 
caseload maximum. Non-maintenance patients include new patients in the induction and 
stabilization phases of treatment as well as patients being withdrawn from buprenorphine. As in 
Section 7.1, the omitted dummies are the Pacific and Caribbean for region, 2006 for year, 
hospital for practice setting, and 30 for the caseload maximum.  
 Section 4.5.3 provides several hypotheses for the results of Experiment #3. The first 
hypothesis involved physicians with PCP-type specialties. It was hypothesized that these 
physicians would treat more non-maintenance patients, all else equal, than other physicians. The 
coefficient on the Sp_PCPtype variable is only significant in the natural-log specification, and 
only under the condition that heteroskedasticity is not corrected for. According to Table 6.8, the 
null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity can be rejected at 10% confidence, but not 5%. (In the 
other specifications, the coefficient has the appropriate sign, but is not statistically significant.) 
According to the OLS result in Table 7.6, a physician in these specialties would treat 40% more 
non-maintenance patients than a physician not in these specialties, consistent with the model 
results from Section 4.5.3.  
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TABLE 7.5 – Patient Count Results from Experiment #3 
Dependent variable: Current Non-Maintenance Patients, NonMCurr 
n = 259 
Ordinary Least Squares Weighted Least Squares 
R2: 0.2046 Adj. R2: 0.1230 R2: 0.3581 Adj. R2: 0.2896 
Independent 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
White 
Standard 
Error 
Parameter 
Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept -5.5154 6.9846 4.2637 -4.0986 6.4943 
Sp_Addict 2.5705 1.7635 1.7466 3.2286 1.1165*** 
Sp_PCPtype 2.7064 1.9077 1.7869 0.1035 1.1925 
Sp_Anesth -7.0428 4.5830 4.6536 1.2717 2.0639 
Sp_PainMed 7.7793 3.1477** 5.2499 1.9511 2.7394 
Sp_Psychiatry 3.1647 1.8810* 1.5925** 1.5949 1.1328 
Add_Cert 1.1245 1.4516 1.7194 -0.9459 0.9332 
Set_Mul 0.8037 2.6677 1.9870 1.2209 1.7460 
Set_Sha -2.0502 3.1963 1.4324 -0.7966 1.6009 
Set_Sin 1.6131 1.9898 1.8172 -0.1775 1.2527 
Set_Sol 1.1029 1.7664 1.6989 -0.4172 1.0742 
Set_Sta -1.3634 4.1219 2.4247 -3.6435 2.0109* 
Region_W 4.8116 6.2099 2.7351* 5.6885 6.1264 
Region_MW 5.7276 6.2441 2.9922* 7.9378 6.1135 
Region_NE 7.7677 6.1483 3.5319** 6.9950 6.0881 
Region_S 5.9907 6.1430 2.8334** 5.4970 6.0917 
Yr2007 -2.9245 2.5376 1.9623 -0.8806 1.2490 
Yr2008 -2.8067 2.0237 1.5615* 0.1845 1.1409 
Yr2009 -1.7236 2.0712 1.6191 0.1397 1.3907 
Yr2010 0.4103 2.0358 1.7214 0.2355 1.4493 
PercentPract -0.0349 0.5269 0.4166 0.6342 0.3403* 
Yrs_Practicing 0.0400 0.0535 0.0504 0.0039 0.0337 
X_is_100 9.5418 1.7464*** 2.9001*** 7.4560 1.8949*** 
Limit_MED -0.5673 1.5780 1.5364 -0.0553 0.8858 
Limit_FIN 0.3615 1.3505 1.1902 -0.9089 0.8062 
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
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TABLE 7.6 – Natural Log of Patient Count Results from Experiment #3 
Dependent variable: Natural Log of Current Non-Maintenance Patients, ln_NonMCurr 
n = 259 
Ordinary Least Squares Weighted Least Squares 
R2: 0.1778 Adj. R2: 0.0934 R2: 0.2249 Adj. R2: 0.1454 
Independent 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
White 
Standard 
Error 
Parameter 
Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 0.4503 0.7224 0.4580 0.5832 0.4889 
Sp_Addict 0.4035 0.1824** 0.1750** 0.4344 0.1721** 
Sp_PCPtype 0.3388 0.1973* 0.2171 0.2627 0.1844 
Sp_Anesth -0.1905 0.4740 0.4834 -0.1001 0.4841 
Sp_PainMed 0.2810 0.3256 0.4369 0.2094 0.3429 
Sp_Psychiatry 0.3215 0.1945* 0.2020 0.2471 0.1815 
Add_Cert 0.0349 0.1501 0.1514 0.0440 0.1373 
Set_Mul 0.0763 0.2759 0.2851 0.0363 0.2660 
Set_Sha -0.6886 0.3306** 0.2255*** -0.7352 0.2526*** 
Set_Sin -0.0192 0.2058 0.1988 -0.1204 0.1921 
Set_Sol -0.1376 0.1827 0.1741 -0.2210 0.1709 
Set_Sta -0.1747 0.4263 0.3233 -0.1715 0.3364 
Region_W 0.2069 0.6423 0.2948 0.0729 0.3714 
Region_MW 0.0789 0.6458 0.3309 0.0104 0.3958 
Region_NE 0.2870 0.6359 0.3101 0.2021 0.3753 
Region_S 0.2715 0.6354 0.2938 0.1401 0.3688 
Yr2007 -0.2403 0.2625 0.2500 -0.1825 0.2387 
Yr2008 -0.2717 0.2093 0.1944 -0.1728 0.1844 
Yr2009 -0.1379 0.2142 0.2016 -0.1481 0.1934 
Yr2010 -0.1098 0.2106 0.2037 -0.1360 0.2008 
PercentPract 0.0957 0.0545* 0.0510* 0.1045 0.0497** 
Yrs_Practicing -0.0039 0.0055 0.0054 -0.0009 0.0052 
X_is_100 0.6298 0.1806*** 0.2116*** 0.5810 0.1880*** 
Limit_MED -0.1331 0.1632 0.1547 -0.2071 0.1464 
Limit_FIN 0.0127 0.1397 0.1278 -0.0124 0.1272 
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
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 It was also hypothesized in Section 4.5.3 that physicians in settings where costs are lower 
would have more non-maintenance patients. The empirical results from Table 7.6 confirm this 
result somewhat. Physicians who practice in a solo practice but in shared office space (Set_Sha) 
have 49.8% to 52.1% fewer non-maintenance patients than do physicians in other practice 
settings. This practice setting implies that costs associated with treating substance abusing 
patients (primarily related to the patients themselves) spill over onto other physicians, but 
coordination of services, economies of scale, and revenue sharing are not present. For these 
reasons, the costs of treating substance abusing patients may be higher for the Set_Sha 
physicians, which is why they have fewer patients. 
 The final hypothesis concerned those physicians who claimed addiction medicine as a 
primary specialty, are board certified in addiction medicine, or who dedicate a higher percentage 
of their practices to addiction treatment. Section 4.5.3 hypothesized that these physicians would 
be expected to have more non-maintenance patients. Support for this hypothesis is not 
overwhelming, but can be found throughout Tables 7.5 and 7.6. Starting with Table 7.5, the 
coefficient on Sp_Addict in the weighted least squares regression is positive and statistically 
significant, and these physicians have 3.2 more non-maintenance patients. In the same column, 
the estimated coefficient on PercentPract is also positive and statistically significant, though the 
magnitude of this effect is small; a 20% increase in the amount of a physician’s practice that is 
dedicated to treating substance abuse results in 0.63 more non-maintenance patients.  
 Turning to Table 7.6, the Sp_Addict coefficient is statistically significant under all three 
sets of conditions, and indicates that physicians specializing in addiction medicine will have 
49.7% to 54.4% more non-maintenance patients, relative to physicians not claiming this primary 
specialty. The PercentPract coefficient is also positive and statistically significant in all three 
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cases, suggesting that a 20% increase in the amount of a physician’s practice dedicated to 
treating substance abuse results in a 10% to 11% increase in the number of non-maintenance 
patients. 
 The OLS results in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 both suggest that psychiatrists have more non-
maintenance patients than do other physicians, all else equal. Using the estimate from the natural 
log specification, a psychiatrist will have 37.9% more of these patients. In terms of the model, 
this could only be the result of lower market power or lower marginal cost. For psychiatrists, the 
latter is a more likely explanation. If so, these results suggest that the lower marginal opportunity 
costs of treating opioid dependent patients with buprenorphine is significant enough to make up 
for the effect of higher market power among psychiatrists. 
 The pain medicine specialty is statistically significant and increases the number of 
patients, according to the OLS results of the patient-count specification in Table 7.5. This result 
is not confirmed anywhere else on Table 7.5 or on Table 7.6. As discussed above with respect to 
psychiatrists, it could be that pain medicine specialists face lower marginal opportunity costs for 
providing treatment with buprenorphine than do other physicians. 
 Another anomalous result is the statistically significant and negative estimated coefficient 
on Set_Sta for the weighted least squares regression with the patient-count specification (Table 
7.5). This result suggests that physicians in staff-model HMOs will have 3.6 fewer non-
maintenance patients than physicians in other practice settings, all else equal. The model from 
Chapter 4 predicts that lower patient counts can be related to more market power or higher 
marginal costs, neither of which seems reasonable. Physicians in HMOs have essentially no 
market power in the sense in which it is being used here. Further, costs such as the need to find 
associated support services, etc., should be lower in an HMO, not higher. It could be that the 
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marginal revenue of treating a patient for opioid dependence with buprenorphine is everywhere 
lower than the marginal cost (which might also be low), so that physicians in HMOs choose to 
withdraw no (or very few) patients. In other words, under capitation, if the patient is already a 
patient, treating their substance abuse delivers a marginal revenue of zero dollars. 
 In the OLS results of the patient-count specification (Table 7.5), many of the region-
specific dummies had statistically significant coefficients only when interpreted using the White 
standard errors. The model provides no guidance on what the expected signs of these coefficients 
should be, but they are all positive, suggesting that physicians in the continental U.S. have more 
patients than other U.S. physicians. This result also suggests that region may be related to the 
heteroskedasticity observed in this sample. (See Table 6.8 for the results of the White test for 
heteroskedasticity.)  
 Similar to a result from Experiment #1, the variable for Yr2008 was statistically 
significant, but only for the OLS regression of the patient-count specification, and only when 
interpreted using the White standard errors. Its sign is negative, indicating that these non-
maintaining physicians had fewer patients in 2008 than in 2006. There is no obvious explanation 
for why this might have been.  
 The final result from Experiment #3 that deserves attention is the everywhere-
statistically-significant estimated coefficient on the X_is_100 variable in Tables 7.5 and 7.6. 
Using the data from Table 7.6, the results suggest that a physician that faces a caseload 
maximum of 100 has between 78.8% and 87.7% more non-maintenance patients than a physician 
that faces a caseload maximum of 30. There are two ways to interpret this result with respect to 
proper substance abuse treatment. On the one hand, increasing the caseload maximum causes 
more patients to be able to enter treatment for opioid abuse. On the other hand, many of these 
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patients may be treated by physicians who have thus far chosen never to maintain any patients, 
despite the TIP’s recommendations to the contrary. It is not clear what phase of treatment these 
additional non-maintenance patients are in. If they are in induction or stabilization, it is possible 
that they may be kept on a maintenance regimen as a result of the increase in the caseload 
maximum. 
 To summarize, the results of Experiment #3, which focused on the number of patients 
being treated by physicians who do not report having any patients on maintenance, conform 
somewhat to the predictions of the model of Chapter 4. There is limited evidence that physicians 
in primary-care type specialties treated more patients than other physicians, as predicted by the 
model, due to lower market power and lower opportunity costs. Physicians in solo practices in 
shared office space treat fewer patients than do other physicians, suggesting that the physician 
considers costs that spill over onto other physicians in the shared space. In Chapter 4, it was 
predicted that physicians who were addiction specialists would be willing to treat more patients 
than other physicians, and the empirical results of Experiment #3 confirm this prediction. 
Finally, physicians who do not maintain patients take on significantly higher numbers of patients 
at higher caseload maximums than they do at lower caseload maximums. 
 
7.4 A SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 Table 7.7 below summarizes the predicted results and actual results of all three 
experiments. In general, the three experiments confirm the predicted results of the model from 
Chapter 4. 
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TABLE 7.7 – Summary of Experimental Results 
Experiment Predicted Results Actual Results 
Experiment #1: 
This experiment 
explores the number 
of patients 
maintained on 
buprenorphine  
(m = q × y) for 
physicians who 
report having both 
maintenance and 
non-maintenance 
patients, but who 
treat fewer total 
patients than the 
maximum allowable 
caseload. 
Physicians in primary-care 
specialties will maintain more 
patients. 
Confirmed. These physicians keep 
14% to 15% more patients on 
maintenance. 
Psychiatrists will maintain fewer 
patients. 
Confirmed. Psychiatrists keep 1 to 3 
fewer patients on maintenance 
relative to other physicians. 
Physicians with attachment to 
addiction treatment will maintain 
more patients. 
Confirmed. A one-category increase 
(e.g., from between 1 and 20% to 
between 21 and 40%) in the 
percentage of practice dedicated to 
substance abuse treatment increases 
the number of patients on 
maintenance by 9%. 
Physicians in solo practices or 
single-specialty group practices will 
keep more patients on maintenance. 
Partially confirmed. Physicians in 
single-specialty group practices 
maintain 2 more patients than 
physicians in other settings. There 
was no statistically significant 
impact from solo practice setting. 
Physicians subject to higher 
caseload maximums will keep more 
patients on maintenance. 
Confirmed. The number of patients 
being maintained rises by 260% 
when the caseload maximum rises 
by 233%, from 30 to 100. 
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TABLE 7.7 – Summary of Experimental Results, continued 
Experiment Predicted Results Actual Results 
Experiment #2: 
This experiment 
explores differences 
in the numbers of 
maintenance and 
non-maintenance 
patients after an 
increase in the 
allowable caseload 
maximum. 
Physicians will have fewer non-
maintenance patients after an 
increase in the caseload maximum. 
Not supported. The intercept, though 
negative, does not achieve statistical 
significance, perhaps because an 
increase from 30 to 100 does not 
constitute a marginal change. 
Physicians will have more 
maintenance patients after an 
increase in the caseload maximum. 
Partially confirmed. The intercept 
has the wrong sign but is not 
statistically significant. When its 
magnitude is compared to other 
positive and statistically significant 
results, it is clear that many 
physicians respond to the higher 
caseload maximum by increasing 
the number of patients on a 
maintenance regimen. 
Experiment #3: 
This experiment 
explores the number 
of non-maintenance 
patients (q) by 
physicians who 
report having no 
patients on 
maintenance, but who 
treat fewer total 
patients than the 
maximum allowable 
caseload. 
Physicians in primary-care 
specialties will have more non-
maintenance patients. 
Confirmed. Physicians in these 
specialties will have 40% more non-
maintenance patients than 
physicians in other specialties. 
Physicians with attachment to 
addiction treatment will have more 
non-maintenance patients. 
Confirmed. Physicians who declare 
addiction medicine as a primary 
specialty have 50% or more 
additional non-maintenance patients 
than other physicians. 
Physicians in solo practices or 
single-specialty group practices 
(where costs are lower) will have 
more non-maintenance patients. 
Partially confirmed. Though the 
coefficients on these practice 
specialties are not significant, 
physicians in shared non-group 
office space (where opportunity 
costs are higher) have 50% fewer 
non-maintenance patients relative to 
physicians in other settings. 
Physicians subject to higher 
caseload maximums will have more 
non-maintenance patients. 
Confirmed. The number of non-
maintenance patients rises by 79 - 
88% when the caseload maximum 
rises from 30 to 100. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
Three experiments were performed in Chapter 7: one on the number of maintenance 
patients (Experiment #1), one on the number of non-maintenance patients (Experiment #3), and 
one on the differences in the numbers of patients of both types after a change in the caseload 
maximum (Experiment #2). Non-maintenance patients include new patients in the induction and 
stabilization phases of treatment as well as patients being withdrawn from buprenorphine. In 
general, the results of the three experiments confirm the predictions of the algebraic model that 
was presented in Chapter 4.  
Physician specialty appears to reveal much about physician market power and 
opportunity costs. Physicians in primary-care-type specialties (like internal medicine, family 
medicine and pediatrics) treat more patients than do physicians in other specialties. The results of 
Experiment #1 suggest that physicians in these specialties maintain 14% to 15% more patients 
than do other physicians (see Table 7.2); the results of Experiment #3 suggest that these 
physicians have 40% more non-maintenance patients than do other physicians (see Table 7.6). 
The physicians in the sample for Experiment #1 also had non-maintenance patients, but the 
physicians in Experiment #3 did not have any patients on maintenance, so the difference in the 
magnitudes of these effects cannot be interpreted. Experiment #2 explored changes in patient 
counts as a result of changes in the caseload maximum, and its results confirmed that physicians 
in primary-care-type specialties will increase the number of patients of both types in response to 
an increase in the caseload maximum. For these physicians, the increase in maintenance patients 
is thrice the increase in non-maintenance patients.  
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Physicians with professional attachment to addiction treatment treat more patients than 
do other physicians, likely because they face lower opportunity costs. Professional attachment to 
addiction treatment is demonstrated in the survey data by certification in addiction medicine, by 
the choice of addiction medicine as a primary specialty, or by the percentage of a physician’s 
practice dedicated to treating patients for substance abuse. In Experiment #1, only the percentage 
of practice dedicated to treating substance abuse has a significant effect on the number of 
patients on maintenance. The results of Experiment #3 suggest that physicians who declare 
addiction medicine as a primary specialty have 50% more non-maintenance patients than 
physicians who do not (see Table 7.6).   
Practice setting appears to reveal less about market power and opportunity cost, so there 
are only limited results that link practice setting to physician treatment choices. The results from 
Experiment #3 suggest that for physicians who do not report having any patients on maintenance 
treatment, practice settings such as a solo practice in a shared office space and staff-model HMO 
are both negatively related to the number of patients treated. It could be that lack of economies of 
scale in solo practices, combined with the potential for costs to spill over, lead these physicians 
to treat fewer patients. Physicians in HMOs may be subject to payment by capitation, whereby 
treating current patients for their addictions may not generate any marginal revenue. Practice 
setting is a complicated variable. The possibilities for economies of scale, cost sharing, revenue 
sharing, and access to physicians in related specialties all suggest that in order for the impact of 
practice setting to be fully explored, the model may have to be extended to include these specific 
elements.  
The most important results from the experiments in Chapter 7 relate to the impact of the 
caseload maximum on the number of maintenance patients (Experiment #1) and non-
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maintenance patients (Experiment #3). In all regression specifications, the dummy variable 
indicating that the physician faced a higher caseload maximum, X_is_100, was positive and 
statistically significant. Specifically, all three experiments confirm that the incidence of 
maintenance treatment rises as the caseload maximum increases.  
Physicians with excess treatment capacity (with respect to the federal caseload 
maximum) and patients of both types (Experiment #1) will increase the number of patients on 
maintenance by 2.5 times when the caseload maximum increases by 2.33 times. This means that 
in response to the caseload maximum, these physicians either reduce their excess capacity to 
maintain more patients, or they have fewer non-maintenance patients. The empirical results from 
Experiment #3 on non-maintenance patients show that physicians who choose not to maintain 
patients also increase the number of patients they treat in response to an increase in the caseload 
maximum, but they increase this number proportionately less.  
The results of the difference-in-maintenance regressions in Experiment #2 (see Table 7.4) 
also confirm this result. Though the intercept is negative, it is not statistically significant. 
Further, many of the other coefficients are positive and greater in magnitude (especially when 
combined) than the negative intercept. Physicians in primary-care type specialties and with the 
average number of years of experience will maintain nearly 40 more patients after the increase in 
the caseload maximum (or about 18 more after considering the negative intercept).  
  
8.2 LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
 This study is subject to several limitations in addition to low numbers of observations for 
Experiment #2 (75) and Experiment #3 (259). First, it made use of data that were originally 
collected for an entirely different purpose. Though the data yielded compelling results, a survey 
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instrument specifically designed for the purposes of this study might have resulted in richer 
results. The survey data allowed for a distinction between the number of maintenance patients 
and the number of non-maintenance patients but did not include any measure of visit count or 
visit intensity in either case. In general, induction and stabilization require more, and more 
frequent, visits than does maintenance, but physicians may differ in the number of visits they 
require during these early phases of treatment, as well as the intensity of those visits with respect 
to tests and other services ordered. Visit frequency and visit intensity in maintenance is subject 
perhaps to even wider variation. The empirical model necessarily treats all “non-maintenance” 
patients alike and all “maintenance” patients alike, but in practice, physicians may vary in their 
ability and willingness to induce more or fewer (or more intense or less intense) visits. The 
algebraic model implicitly assumed that all non-maintenance patients were in the induction and 
stabilization phases of treatment, but they could also have been in the dose reduction phase. 
 The model also does not consider patient expectations over treatment, but treats the 
decision about maintenance as solely the physician’s decision. While this is approximately the 
case, in order to explore the role of demand inducement in treatment with buprenorphine, it 
would be necessary to have patient-level data that revealed what patients wanted from treatment. 
The substance abuse treatment community has formed a consensus with respect to the proper use 
of buprenorphine, but it is not clear how well patient goals or expectations align with these 
treatment protocols. 
 The analysis also ignores any potential impact of third-party payment, whether by private 
medical insurance or public assistance such as block grants. Because financial considerations 
appear to play some role in the physician’s decision to prescribe buprenorphine (and for what 
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purpose to prescribe it) these missing data may limit the proper interpretation of the results of 
Chapter 7. 
 The data used in the empirical work of Chapters 6 and 7 contain physician-level data 
about current caseloads. It does not allow for the calculation of 1) the rate at which induction or 
stabilization is successful, 2) the rate at which successfully-stabilized patients are maintained on 
buprenorphine or 3) the rate at which maintenance patients are eventually withdrawn. If 
physicians inexperienced with buprenorphine have lower success rates in induction and 
stabilization, then their pools of potential maintenance patients are likewise smaller. Over time 
(or during the one year that elapses between first and second DEA notifications), inexperienced 
physicians may make marginally greater strides in their success rates, causing the empirical 
results to overestimate the effect of physician specialty on responses to the caseload maximum.  
 The final, and perhaps most important, limitation of the study is the fact that the data did 
not include an exact record of the caseload maximum faced by the physician at the time of the 
observation. The current caseload maximum had to be imputed. Though the imputation was 
rigorous, it would have been preferable to have physician-reported data to ensure that this 
variable was not miscoded. Given the imputation and sample creation methods discussed in 
Chapter 6, it is more likely that some physicians who actually faced only 30-patient caseload 
maximums were misidentified as physicians who faced 100-patient caseload maximums. In this 
case, it is possible that the analysis in Chapter 7 underestimates the true impact of the increase in 
the federal caseload maximum. 
 In addition to addressing the limitations noted above, the analysis of the preceding 
chapters could be extended. Over time, more observations will become available, allowing 
Experiments #2 and #3 to be repeated. Higher numbers of observations could also allow for an 
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increase in the number of independent variables (and interaction terms) included in the 
regressions. This could allow for more detailed analysis of the differential impact of caseload 
maximums on physicians in different specialties, different settings, or different specialty/setting 
combinations. 
 The model presented in Chapter 4 assumed that the physician was able to induce demand 
for maintenance treatment (in either a positive or negative direction). The model could be 
extended with the formulation of a non-inducement companion model. The comparative statics 
results of the two models could be compared to each other—and also to the empirical results—to 
perform tests on the null hypothesis of no demand inducement in the spirit of Schaafsma (1994). 
In this way, the analysis performed here could contribute to the literature on supplier-induced 
demand by providing another unique test. 
 The model was also only a two-period model, eliminating the possibility of maintenance-
then-withdrawal as a possible treatment path. The model could be extended either to a three 
period model or an infinite-time-horizon model. An extended model of this type could take 
advantage of the ability to separate in the data “new” patients (in induction or stabilization) from 
“withdrawal” patients (those in dose reduction).  
 
8.3 SUMMARY 
 The results of this study, presented in the last chapter, support the conclusion that many 
factors other than recommended treatment protocols may enter into physician decision-making. 
Federal caseload maximums have a clear impact on both the volume of treatment for opioid 
dependence as well as the nature of this treatment. Increased federal caseload maximums lead to 
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an increase of patients maintained on buprenorphine that is disproportionately greater than the 
increase in total patient counts.  
 The physician’s specialty and professional attachment to substance abuse treatment also 
influence the choice of treatment path. Physicians in specialties with lower opportunity costs and 
less market power (such as internal medicine, family medicine or pediatrics) treat more patients 
at any given federal caseload maximum than do physicians in other specialties. Though these 
physicians respond to increased federal caseload maximums by having both more maintenance 
patients and more non-maintenance patients, they add about three patients to their maintenance 
caseload for every one additional non-maintenance patient. Psychiatrists appear to maintain 
fewer patients (Table 7.1) and have more non-maintenance patients (Tables 7.5 and 7.6) than do 
physicians in other specialties, but they respond to an increase in the caseload maximum by 
disproportionately increasing the number of patients they keep on maintenance (Tables 7.3 and 
7.4). As should be expected, physicians with professional attachment to substance abuse 
treatment (demonstrated by board certification, primary specialty, or percentage of practice 
dedicated to substance abuse treatment) treat more patients of both types than do other 
physicians.  
 Policymakers should bear in mind that restrictions placed on physicians—such as the 
federal caseload maximum for waivered physicians using buprenorphine to treat opioid 
dependence—can have significant impacts on the treatment decisions made by physicians. 
Physicians are not homogenous. Specialty, practice setting, board certification, years of 
experience and other variables are all related to the physician’s treatment choice. This is true 
even with respect to conditions for which there is considerable consensus in the research and 
academic communities regarding treatment. Even in the face of strong and consistent support for 
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medication-assisted maintenance treatment of opioid dependence, and recommended protocols 
and training that endorse the same, many physicians still offer limited maintenance treatment. 
This could be the result of ideology, but this study supports the notion that economic 
considerations also enter into physician decision-making.    
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APPENDIX A: THE PHYSICIAN SURVEY 
PHYSICIAN SURVEY, TEXT OF SELECTED QUESTIONS, Version 4/1/05 
1. What do you consider to be your primary specialty? (Mark no more than three) 
• Addictions 
• Allergy 
• Anesthesiology 
• Cardiology 
• Community Health 
• Dermatology 
• Emergency Medicine 
• Endocrinology 
• Family Medicine 
• Gastroenterology 
• Immunology 
• Internal Medicine 
• Neurology 
• Ob-Gyn 
• Occupational Medicine 
• Oncology 
• Pain Medicine 
• Pediatrics 
• Psychiatry 
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• Pulmonary Medicine 
• Rehabilitation Medicine 
• Surgery 
• Other Specialty 
2. How many years have you been licensed to practice medicine, in any state? 
____ Years of practice 
3. Mark any of these certifications in addiction medicine that you currently hold. 
• American Board of Medical Specialties 
• American Society of Addiction Medicine 
• American Osteopathic Association 
• Not certified in addiction medicine 
4. Which of these best describes your current practice? If you are involved in more than one 
practice, select the one where you are most likely to care for substance abusing patients. (Select 
only one) 
• Solo practice 
• Solo practice, space shared with other physicians 
• Single specialty group practice 
• Multispecialty group practice 
• Hospital-owned practice 
• Staff model HMO 
• Other type of practice 
6. On which date are you filling out this section of the survey? 
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________   / ________    /  ________ 
Month  Day  Year 
9. What percentage of your total medical practice during this period would you estimate was 
devoted to treating substance abuse patients? 
• 0% 
• 1 - 20% 
• 21 - 40% 
• 41 - 60% 
• 61 - 80% 
• 81 - 100% 
11. Within the past 90 days, how many patients have you treated with buprenorphine for opioid 
dependence? Count all patients, regardless of whether or not you are seeing them under a CSAT 
Waiver? 
________ Buprenorphine patients 
12. How many patients are you currently treating with Suboxone and Subutex for opioid 
dependence? Count all patients, regardless of whether or not you are seeing them under a CSAT 
Waiver? 
________ Suboxone  ________ Subutex 
 
13. How many of these patients currently on Suboxone or Subutex are on maintenance and how 
many are on a withdrawal regimen? 
________ Maint.  ________ Wdwl. 
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14. What do you think are the limitations associated with buprenorphine maintenance treatment? 
(Mark no more than three) 
• Titration of dose is difficult/time consuming 
• High cost 
• Inadequate third-party reimbursement 
• Low patient acceptance or interest 
• Limited effectiveness 
• Likelihood of adverse events 
• Medical complications 
• Difficulty accessing counseling or other services 
• Lack of pharmacies carrying buprenorphine 
• Diversion risk 
• Federal patient limit 
• Recordkeeping requirements 
• Concern about DEA involvement 
• Other ______________________ Specify (print) 
15. In the past 90 days, how many individuals did you turn down for buprenorphine treatment 
because of the federal limit on physicians’ buprenorphine caseloads? 
________ Patients turned down 
 
PHYSICIAN SURVEY, TEXT OF SELECTED QUESTIONS, Version 4/7/08 
1. What do you consider to be your primary specialty? (Mark no more than three) 
• Addictions 
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• Allergy 
• Anesthesiology 
• Cardiology 
• Community Health 
• Dermatology 
• Emergency Medicine 
• Endocrinology 
• Family Medicine 
• Gastroenterology 
• Immunology 
• Internal Medicine 
• Neurology 
• Ob-Gyn 
• Occupational Medicine 
• Oncology 
• Pain Medicine 
• Pediatrics 
• Psychiatry 
• Pulmonary Medicine 
• Rehabilitation Medicine 
• Surgery 
• Other Specialty 
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2. How many years have you been licensed to practice medicine, in any state? 
____ Years of practice 
3. Mark any of these certifications in addiction medicine that you currently hold. 
• American Board of Medical Specialties 
• American Society of Addiction Medicine 
• American Osteopathic Association 
• Not certified in addiction medicine 
4. Which of these best describes your current practice? If you are involved in more than one 
practice, select the one where you are most likely to care for substance abusing patients. (Select 
only one) 
• Solo practice 
• Solo practice, space shared with other physicians 
• Single specialty group practice 
• Multispecialty group practice 
• Hospital-owned practice 
• Staff model HMO 
• Other type of practice 
5. How long have you been certified to prescribe buprenorphine for the treatment of opioid 
dependence? 
• Less than 1 year 
• 1 - 2 years 
• 3 - 4 years 
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• More than 4 years 
8. On which date are you filling out this section of the survey? 
________   / ________    /  ________ 
Month  Day  Year 
11. What percentage of your total medical practice during this period would you estimate was 
devoted to treating substance abuse patients? 
• 0% 
• 1 - 20% 
• 21 - 40% 
• 41 - 60% 
• 61 - 80% 
• 81 - 100% 
13. Within the past 90 days, how many patients have you treated with buprenorphine for opioid 
dependence? Count all patients, regardless of where you saw them. 
________ Buprenorphine patients 
14. How many patients are you currently treating with Suboxone and Subutex for opioid 
dependence? Count all patients, regardless of where you see them. 
________ Suboxone  ________ Subutex 
Note— In answering questions 15 and 16, be sure the total number of patients reported always 
equals the total patients on Suboxone and Subutex reported in question 14. 
16. How many of your patients, in all settings, are in the following phases of buprenorphine 
treatment? 
________ Induction  ________ Maintenance  ________ Dose tapering 
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19. In the past 90 days, how many individuals did you turn down for buprenorphine treatment 
because of the federal limit on physicians’ buprenorphine caseloads? 
________ Patients turned down 
20. What do you think are the limitations associated with buprenorphine maintenance treatment? 
(Mark no more than three) 
• Titration of dose is difficult/time consuming 
• High cost 
• Inadequate third-party reimbursement 
• Low patient acceptance or interest 
• Limited effectiveness 
• Likelihood of adverse events 
• Medical complications 
• Difficulty accessing counseling or other services 
• Lack of pharmacies carrying buprenorphine 
• Diversion risk 
• Federal patient limit 
• Recordkeeping requirements 
• Concern about DEA involvement 
• Other ______________________ Specify (print) 
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 In 2000, changes in federal law allowed physicians to receive waivers to use narcotic 
medications, such as buprenorphine, for treatment of opioid dependence. As of 2006, physicians 
have been allowed to treat up to 100 patients after spending one year at a 30-patient limit. 
Physicians may choose to discontinue use of buprenorphine after the patient has successfully 
discontinued use of the substance of abuse ("withdrawal"), or physicians can keep patients on 
buprenorphine indefinitely ("maintenance"). The model in this dissertation assumes that demand 
for treatment of opioid dependence is exogenous but that demand for maintenance treatment can 
be induced by the physician. Using data from quarterly surveys of physicians from 2006 to 2010, 
this dissertation analyzes the impact of the higher caseload limit on the number of patients and 
the treatment path chosen by the physician. It finds support for the conclusion that physicians 
treat more patients after an increase in the caseload limit. The impact is particularly strong for 
maintenance, suggesting that the caseload limit discourages maintenance treatment. The 
dissertation also finds that this effect is stronger for physicians in primary-care type specialties. 
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